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Abstract:
Persuasive discourse, typically in political communication,  implies arousing 
adherence. Persuasion aims to bring out a shared semantic territory in the 
audience, a common, often hidden or unconscious, worldview. Naturally, 
persuasion is the privilege of a person someway associated with signs denoting 
“power, commitment, fairness, and social attractiveness”. Substantially, per-
suasion is a cognitive process triggered or implemented by messages capable 
to infl uencing the attitudes of persons and their representation of the world. 
Th us, language of persuasion involves linguistic and pragmatic tools eff ective 
in infl uencing the collective imaginary and the feelings and beliefs of the 
people. Argumentative and rhetorical devices, metaphors, the structure of the 
sentence, lexical selection, symbols and images contribute to achieving persua-
sive eff ects by evoking a common cognitive ground as the basic dimension of 
legitimization and identity. Th is theoretical framework is tested on the basis 
of the political communication of some leaders which played or currently play 
an important role in the past or current Italian politics, such as Mussolini, De 
Gasperi, Togliatti, Berlusconi, Salvini and others. Th eir rhetorical choices and 
the symbols they rely on will be analyzed with the purpose of investigating the 
concealed or implicated semantics of their messages. 
Keywords: argumentative procedures, linguistic devices in discourse, persuasive 
discourse, political communication, symbols and metaphors
1. Persuasion 
Defi ning persuasive communication, and specifi cally per-
suasive discourse, implies eliciting compliance. In this direction, 
Bülow-Møller (2005: 28) recalls that persuasion aims at creating 
a common ground, a sort of “shared territory” favoring possible 
“common visions and solutions”. Together, persuasion is the priv-
ilege of a person connoted by “linguistic signals denoting power, 
commitment, fairness, and social attractiveness”. So, persuasion is 
a cognitive process responding to the communication of a message 
whereby interlocutors or an audience change their “attitudes or be-
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havior regarding an issue” (Perloff 2003: 34). According to Perloff (2003: 8) persuasion includes 
linguistic and non-verbal symbols and involves the deliberate intention to influence. Moreover:
People persuade themselves to change attitudes or behavior. Communicators provide the argu-
ments’ and the influence is freely accepted by the receiver. Self-persuasion is the crucial mechanism. It 
is no accident if theoretical models foreground the crucial role of the audience, in other words they are 
concerned with ‘how sender and receiver come together to create a shared reality. (Borchers 2013: 17)
Persuasion is, ultimately, the “coproduction of meaning”, the issue that this contribution 
aims to investigate along the lines of analysis in Baldi (2017, 2019).
Is a very special use of language necessary for persuasion to take place? Virtanen and Hal-
mari (2005: 5) note that an intrinsic property of language use is being persuasive, since any 
linguistic interaction entails some sort of change in the thought of interlocutors. However, 
persuasion strictu sensu is associated with “linguistic choices that aim at changing or affecting 
the behaviour of others or strengthening the existing beliefs and behaviors of those who already 
agree”. As underlined by Sperber and Wilson (1996: 57-58) the interpretation of a linguistic 
act combines the content of a proposition with the propositional attitude of the communicator 
and the implementation of implicatures and inferences:
informative intention is better described as an intention to modify directly not the thoughts but 
the cognitive environment of the audience. The actual cognitive effects of a modification of the cognitive 
environment are only partly predictable.
This definition of the way in which language influences the informative contents of 
interlocutors seems to be suitable to characterize the basic effect of persuasive language in 
“strengthening” the beliefs and symbolic universe of the audience rather than changing their 
thinking and behavior. This to say that persuasion, however conceived, is a property inherent 
in the way of using language by humans, insofar as natural language semantics is based on and 
mediated by mental operations (Chomsky 1988, 2004, 2005) underlying the conceptualization 
of experience and the world. 
Turning to political language, a longstanding question is how it is able to change or 
re-elaborate the worldview of persons, and affect their beliefs and values. Naturally, we know 
that linguistic expressions have the effect of transferring pieces of a semantic representation 
into the mind/brain of the recipient, insofar as speaker and hearer share the common language 
faculty and a common conceptual model of the world and the mind. The point, here, is how, 
through the ability to interpret a sentence, in the particular language known by the interloc-
utors, the ideas of one can (possibly) migrate into the worldview of the other. We move here 
at the interface between linguistic knowledge (I(nternal)-language) as establishing a specific 
lexical-syntactic level of meaning, and the use of language in discourse, where the intentions 
of the speaker shape a particular representation of reality. More to the point, the sharing of 
thoughts and beliefs is the result of the communicative process, whereas linguistic expressions, 
in themselves, do not imply the strict correspondence of meanings and sounds in the speaker 
and the recipient, as highlighted by Chomsky (2000: 30):
Successful communication between Peter and Mary [two interlocutors] does not entail the existence 
of shared meanings or shared pronunciations in a public language (or a common treasure of thoughts or 
articulations of them), any more the physical resemblance between Peter and Mary entails the existence 
of a public form that they share.
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As to the internal properties of language, mutual comprehension among speakers, i.e. the 
assumption that speakers know the same I-Language, corresponds to the condition that the 
interlocutors establish a relation of congruence between the sentences that they enounce. More 
precisely, each interlocutor, listening to the other, assumes identical basic properties underly-
ing the structure of the linguistic expressions as formed by the same combinatory operation, 
substantially the coincidence of the language faculty:
The only (virtually) ‘shared structure’ among humans generally is the initial state of the language 
faculty. Beyond that we expect to find no more than approximations, as in the case of other natural 
objects that grow and develop. (Ibidem)
We must conclude that the semantic import of the linguistic forms relies on other inter-
pretive means driven by our cognitive capabilities. In fact, the notion of conceptual common 
ground is very elusive, as suggested by Chomsky:
It may be that a kind of public (or interpersonal) character to thought and meaning results from 
uniformity of initial endowment, which permits only I-languages that are alike in significant respects, 
[…] But […] the character of thought and meaning varies as interest and circumstance vary, with no 
clear way to establish further categories, […]. (Ibidem) 
It is no accident if the theories on interpretation must not dispense with the connection to 
conversational mechanisms, contextual implicatures and belief systems. As claimed by Sperber 
and Wilson (1996), the basic requirement in the exchange of information is that it be compatible 
with human cognitive organization. The activation of implicatures not directly associated with 
the context and suggested by lexical and rhetorical choices intentionally made by the speaker, 
enhances the semantic potential of the message (Sperber and Wilson 1996). This result is surely 
also based on illocutionary force and other pragmatic tools. Nevertheless, more covert and so-
phisticated linguistic (lexical and syntactic ones), pragmatic and semantic properties are involved, 
that bridge the divide between language and symbolic representation of feelings, beliefs and often 
unconscious cognitive systems of values. The latter underlie the frames feeding the interpretation 
of the world, society and human relationships. The crucial role of the Principle of Relevance for 
the argumentative theory of reasoning, supports a Post-Gricean theory whereby pragmatic inter-
pretation is necessary for a full comprehension of the message (Reboul 2017). 
The process of interpretation, in turn, implies the distinction between ‘persuade/convince’ 
on the basis of a coherent argumentation, bringing to comprehension (cf. Zanacchi 2006), and 
‘persuade’ by means of simple cues and unanalyzed information. This difference is evidenced 
in the classical psycho-social framework (Petty and Cacioppo 1986), and is frequently implied 
in the study of communications inducing attitude change in the audience. By the way, human 
minds encompass two systems of reasoning: the heuristic system, “fast and frugal, made of 
heuristics (or biases […]), which, while they may occasionally be wrong, deliver correct answers 
most of the time”; the analytic system, cognitively costly, used for detecting what appears wrong 
or doubtful in the conclusions reached by the heuristic system (Reboul 2017: 212). However, 
argumentation is frequently based not on logic but on biases and heuristics. So, only a social 
perspective of the role of reasoning is adequate to account for the fact that it is used not for 
proving the logical nature of an assertion but for adducing elements – argumentation – in 
favour of the validity of one’s own point of view, substantially for persuading the recipient. 
An aspect of persuasive discourse is manipulation, not necessarily occurring, although many 
of the linguistic or symbolic devices of persuasion are manipulative, as, for instance, the recourse 
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to religious symbols or to apodictically presented arguments, that are rhetorical means able to 
distort the argumentation. In manipulative discourse the cognitive process of information is 
“perturbed” by misuse of words, more generally, by the use of semantic vagueness and vacuity, 
so crucially betraying the Gricean maxims, mainly the one of quality. Interestingly, Saussure 
(2005: 119-121) observes that manipulative discourse is not “about using metaphors” and 
other syntactic or semantic solutions, but about how these devices play a particular pragmatic 
role. Manipulative discourse is a particular type of persuasive discourse based on propositions:
 
truth-functionally defective (roughly, they are wrong in some way: false, unlikely, doubtful, inac-
curate, inconsistent with the common ground; and therefore should be rejected by the hearer under 
normal circumstances.
The conclusion of Saussure is that this type of discourse has to do with moral statements 
concerning desirable states of affairs and not with actual states of affairs. We might wonder 
when political discourse reflects or expresses actual states of affairs, since it typically expresses 
ends and purposes, and tends to investigate and depict persons and society. So, manipulation 
is committed to figure a new or alternative world, a different moral culture. Escaping the eval-
uation of the hearer is obtained by fuzziness, and vagueness renders the rules of interpretation 
impossible or difficult to be applied, thus coercing reliance on the general values and beliefs 
shared by speaker and hearers. Methods for leading the audience to an ‘irrational consent’ in-
clude textual genres based on an excess of metaphors, recourse to mystical or religious language 
and images and vagueness activating strong presuppositions, i.e. self-evident assertions, possibly 
tautological, that cannot be negated. 
A result of this model is that any expressive means helping one consolidate and improve 
argumentation is properly a part of argumentative discourse, including metaphors (Ervas et 
al. 2016). Their crucial property resides in opening a conceptual frame, thus leading to the 
cognitive multiplication of interpretive spaces. Chilton (2005) speaks of the blending effect, 
whereby a metaphor can trigger a cluster of properties derived from metaphoric meaning. 
Blending reveals the cognitive entrenchment whereby a particular metaphor generates mapping 
from the source of the metaphor to the relevant semantic domain and, as a consequence, leads 
people to unconsciously draw conclusions and decisions.1
Persuasive procedures are implemented by resorting to manipulation and argumentation, 
implying the interaction of many linguistic and discourse means. Besides, modern political 
discourse cannot dispense with non-linguistic ways of communication, based on visual symbols 
and images, crucial in a social reality governed by mass- and social-media, and technological 
networks. In what follows three faces of persuasion in political discourse will be discussed, i.e. 
argumentation, metaphors and symbols. In these domains, symbolic representations such as 
images and concrete signs, acquire a central role in conveying the stigma of a common belong-
ing and moral categories. see that a sharp boundary between argumentation and manipulation 
1 The effects of metaphorical framing are investigated in relation to two main perspectives, the critical-discourse approach 
(CDA) and the response-elicitation approach (REA) (Boeynaems et al. 2017). CDA is focused on the “real world changes” 
in relation to metaphorical framing”, while REA is interested in the responses of “participants exposed to language stimuli in 
a research situation”. These analyses show that CDA frames engender negative interpretations more systematically than the 
ones occurring in REA experiments. Boeynaems et al. (2017: 130) note that this discrepancy could be due to the nature of 
the approach. In other words, CDA could be more oriented to discover the association between metaphorical frames and 
certain pre-defined aspects of society, whereby “Moreover, an interest in the role of discourse on social inequality and power 
dominance suggests a tendency to look for effects of metaphorical frames used by power elites that are in line with the frame”.
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is difficult to find and that symbols, figurative speech, appeals and systematic research for a 
common worldview create a single interpretive texture combining lexicon, syntax, prosody, 
images and gestures. 
2. Political discourse
Political discourse contextualizes social practices (Leeuwen 2008); it narrates and expresses 
the contents underlying the shared symbolic universe. In political discourse, therefore, pragmatic 
procedures have a decisive role associated with the production of meanings, as they represent the 
system of beliefs and convictions of the recipients. Although these procedures do not necessarily 
aim to construe self-identification, they generally have the effect of introducing ideas, messages 
and content that enrich the shared cognitive space. The representation of the relationship of trust 
with the voter or, in general, with listeners has a central role in these shared values and a feeling of 
belonging to the same symbolic network produces persuasion, i.e. the acceptance of a particular 
representation of individuals, events or states of affairs by the audience. Mental states of receivers are 
involved inasmuch as the semantics, although concealed or ambiguously expressed, introduced by 
the message needs to be integrated in the “system of expectations of the receivers” (Eco 1968: 140). 
This, let us remember, is a property from the beginning associated with classical rhetoric, whereby: 
Rhetoric proceeded to review these ways of thinking, these common and acquired opinions, and 
these arguments already assimilated by the social body, responding to pre-established systems of expec-
tations. (Eco 1968: 140) 
Desideri (1984: 19) identifies some of the typical features of political discourse: relation 
with the social ways of production and reception of messages, the relevancy of the ritual traits 
of the enunciation, the recognizability of this common ground of meaning by the addressee. 
Political communication is basically organized in order to construct or evidence the relation-
ship of trust and agreement that the sender assumes there be with the addressees (Baldi 2007, 
2012, 2018, Baldi and Savoia 2017). A crucial property of political discourse is the ability to 
replace the experience of reality with its representation by means of the semantics, the symbols 
and beliefs of the recipients. Edelman (1977: 26) reminds us that it is political language that 
creates the cognitive structures hosting the knowledge of events: 
Only rarely can there be direct observations of events, and even then language forms shape the 
meaning of what the general public and government officials see. It is language that evokes most of the 
political “realities” people experience. The challenge is to learn how language and gestures are systemat-
ically transformed into complex cognitive structures. 
So, mastering political discourse means having the capability of exercising control over peo-
ple’s thought or at least having the tools necessary for doing so. Linguistic expressions, therefore, 
are interpreted as they are able to introduce meaning structures and cognitive environments. 
The tie between language and political discourse is subtler than is generally assumed, insofar as 
language incorporates pre-political meanings and beliefs that influence explicit political rhetoric:
The fundamental influences upon political beliefs flow, however, from language that is not perceived 
as political at all but nonetheless structures perceptions of status, authority, merit, deviance, and the 
causes of social problems. (Edelman 1977: 35)
Although the pragmatic perspective concerning the construction of meanings helps us 
account for the way in which persons interact by means of utterances in communicative situ-
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ations, it is still true that there are uses of language, including political discourse, that show a 
particular status. Not surprisingly, political discourse favours or, better, relies on sharing beliefs 
rather than understanding facts. The irrational nature of this type of discourse is outlined in a 
precise and acute way by Leibniz (1982: 255-258) in Nouveaux Essais sur l’entendement humain 
(1765) in which he considers “the authority, the party, the custom” the cause of a “kind of 
madness” that distorts the reasoning processes and identifies in the “search for truth” the only 
possible solution. This property of political language is one of the characteristics studied by 
Critical Discourse Analysis, as noted by van Dijk (2001: 357):
[…] recipients tend to accept beliefs, knowledge, and opinions (unless they are inconsistent with 
their personal beliefs and experiences) through discourse from what they see as authoritative, trustworthy, 
or credible sources, such as scholars, experts, professionals, or reliable media. 
However, there is a basic dimension in political discourse that calls into question both 
the “kind of madness” invoked by Leibniz and the issuer’s authority, in the sense of van Dijk. 
Chilton (2005), examining a propaganda text such as Mein Kampf asks himself “How do 
the ideas get transferred from mind to mind?” and points out that the recipient has sufficient 
interpretive means to decide whether to believe or adhere to the assertions contained in a text:
Of course, no-one has to accept as true any of the virtual worlds set up in discourse. But in so far 
as propositions come as social transactions claiming prima facie to be true, people are inclined to accept 
them as true, initially, […]. Still, because human language users are also good at detecting deception, 
speakers may want to take preemptive measures. This means that speakers often seek to build in guar-
antees, authorisations and assurances as to their veracity, seeking to appeal to whatever they believe their 
interlocutors believe to be veracious. (Chilton 2005: 22)
In other words, cognitive components underlying the organization of human mind are involved: 
Some of the cognitive components that make up political ideologies are ‘parasitic’ on basic modular 
knowledge, […] The cognitive components in question are both representational in nature and proce-
dural. The representational part belongs to different modules – e.g., intuitive physics, intuitive biology, 
intuitive physiology modules. (Ibidem: 18)
Hence, the recipient has interpretive means sufficient to decide whether to believe in or 
adhere to the assertions presented in the text. When we speak of manipulation of consciences 
by political propaganda, we have to take into account the fact that the recipient has intellectual 
and interpretive capabilities neither smaller than nor different from the ones of the sender. 
Even if manipulative properties seem to characterize persuasive speech, the latter aims 
however to include argumentative properties as well. The evocation of feelings, fear, aversion, 
patriotism, i.e. the substance of manipulation, can be part of an argumentation. In keeping 
with Mercier and Sperber (2011) reasoning is argumentative and, in this, it is adaptive inso-
far as reasoning fulfils “the exceptional dependence of humans on communication and their 
vulnerability to misinformation”. In their framework, the role of reasoning is primarily social, 
in the sense that it provides people with expressive means necessary to support and justify a 
conclusion or decision. In other words, it does not ensure the reliability of argumentation but 
aims at strengthening claims and opinions introduced by persons:
the function of reasoning is primarily social: In particular, it allows people to anticipate the need 
to justify their decisions to others. This predicts that the use of reasoning in decision making should 
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increase the more likely one is to have to justify oneself […] In all these cases, reasoning does not lead 
to more accurate beliefs about an object, to better estimates of the correctness of one’s answer, or to 
superior moral judgments. Instead, by looking only for supporting arguments, reasoning strengthens 
people’s opinions, distorts their estimates, and allows them to get away with violations of their own 
moral intuitions. In these cases, epistemic or moral goals are not well served by reasoning. By contrast, 
argumentative goals are: People are better able to support their positions or to justify their moral judg-
ments. (Mercier, Sperber 2011: 10)
Therefore, in argumentation all means become useful as means for supporting one’s claim, 
including confirmation bias, as available arguments or justification for the argumentation, 
regardless of their truth value and the poverty of the results they bring. 
All in all, persuasion strategies rely on crucial discourse and linguistic properties embedding 
a covert link with a cognitive deep level, activating the unconscious sentiments and beliefs of 
the audience, “the value that we place on ideas and beliefs on a scale of goodness and badness” 
(Charteris-Black 2005: 13). In this, metaphors are the essential device, in discourse as well 
as in symbolic procedures (images, posters, behaviors), as far as they awaken our deep moral 
categories underlying the frames that give sense to our experience of the world and society. 
In keeping with Sebera and Lu (2018), it is this linking that triggers feelings of legitimization 
or de-legitimization with regard to the consenting groups or the opponents and objector and 
critical stands:
The essence of legitimization by political leaders is to identify a set of values regarding what is good 
and bad because these beliefs as to what is good and bad form the basis for political action. Communi-
cation style is essential to legitimization. (Charteris-Black 2005: 22)
An interesting point is that the reference to ideologies is apparently conscious, at least to 
the extent that they are sets of ideas: 
that explain and justify ends and means of organized social action, and specifically political action, 
irrespective of whether such action aims to preserve, amend, uproot or rebuild a given social order. 
(Seliger 1976: 14)
On the other hand, ideologies give shape to imaginary worlds and moral roots otherwise 
generally unexpressed or only intuited. The semantic force of the discourse and symbols are 
able to convey concepts related to these values and moral obligations, i.e. ‘ought’, ‘duty’, ‘good’ 
and ‘bad’, ‘right’ and ‘wrong’. Inglehart (1977, 2018) proposes the distinction between mate-
rialist and post-materialist values, where the symbolic system of materialism is concerned with 
securitarian matters, the rejection of modernization, suspicion of scientific knowledge and 
education, i.e. contrary to the symbolic post-materialist background, implying a critical vision 
of society and the world and free expression attitudes.
However, these categories are not univocal, in turn stemming from existential and elementary 
behavioural and conceptual primitives such as parental influence on personal identity construction 
(Lakoff 1996, 2008). Lakoff (1996, 2008, 2016) connects our models of society, morality and role 
of individuals with the styles of family, the Strict Father model and the Nurturant Parent, which 
give rise to two kinds of framing of social relations and worldviews. Specifically, these different 
models “provide” metaphors for morality: the conservative moral categories such as strength, 
authority, self- discipline and responsibility, reward and punishment, upholding moral order, 
protecting moral people from external evils contrast with progressive categories such as nurturance, 
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empathetic behaviour and promoting fairness, helping and protecting those who cannot help and 
protect themselves, promoting fulfi lment in life. Th ese oppositions are rooted in the profound 
moral content that everyone adheres to, consciously or not, and infl uence our moral worldviews 
“encapsulated in two very diff erent common forms of family life: Th e Nurturant Parent family 
(progressive) and the Strict Father family (conservative)” (Lakoff  2016: 2). 
Th e diff erent forms of political discourse as well as of commercial advertising explore atavis-
tic and profound emotional contents, such as the patriarchal/natural family, the fears triggered 
by diversity, and the inequality of civil rights and personal liberties. We are talking about the 
pre-conscious or basic perceptions that inspire many stereotypes concerning society and reality. 
Moreover, globalization phenomena have caused a crisis of the identity of persons and new ap-
parently available freedom has made social and life conditions less defi ned and more uncertain 
(Bauman 2003, 2009). As a consequence, fear of the unknown seems to be an effi  cient feeling 
stirred up by political language in recent years. Th is contributes, for instance, to enhancing the 
particularistic and ethnic right-wing linguistic approach of Salvini, in Italy, or Le Pen in France, 
but, more usually, is a sort of subtext generally underlying much political discourse in Western 
society which is struggling, on the other hand, to foreshadow a clear perspective of progress. Fears 
strengthen persuasiveness as a powerful key of interpretation of the people.
Stereotyped imagines permeate all the dimensions of persuasive communication. Suffi  ce it to 
think of commercial advertising, where covert or explicit use of the more easygoing and lenient 
representations of common feelings and imaginary substantiates the process of argumentation and 
persuasion. Institutional communication is no exception, insofar as it needs to aff ect or change 
the convictions and thoughts of the people. In this sad hour, where Italy (and the world) is hit by 
an epidemic, the Italian Prime Minister, in his messages concerning the measures to contain the 
epidemic, used the consoling slogan, then resumed and translated into the fi gurative scheme in 
(1) where the rainbow is above the lettering.
(1) Tutto andrà bene   ‘Everything will be all right’
Like any slogan, this is also based on a common framework implying the manner of facing 
the diffi  culties in terms of confi dence in a “good father of a family”, in Lakoff  ‘s (2008, 2016) 
sense. It is reasonable to conclude that it is precisely because it intercepts a profound feeling 
of the people that it has great popularity and becomes a sort of series of keywords in the social 
media and in other forms of communication.
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So, persuasiveness is, in itself, non-rational precisely because it cannot avoid evoking the 
unconscious basis of our worldviews, if it aims to be successful. This also explains why met-
aphors generally are so crucial in language and specifically in persuasive styles of discourse. 
Metaphors have the capacity to multiply and create conceptual and symbolic relations through 
the connection between the source, a concrete, generally sensorial or elementary experience, 
and the target, the world of social relations and expectations. 
3. Argumentations and claims: emotive language 
Starting from the Fregean distinction between meaning (Sinn) and denotation (Bedeutung) 
(Frege 1862), the truth value of an expression separates descriptive sentences associated with a 
verifiable state of affairs from sentences introducing possible worlds, not reducible to truth crite-
ria. Nevertheless, although this distinction captures the two semantic faces of natural language, 
the reference to individuals or events/states of affairs is however filtered through interpretive 
processes of which linguistic expressions are only one of the components. What is more, the 
utterances implement illocutionary processes such as exhortation, persuasion, command etc. 
Logical validity and truth-conditions of sentences are only a part of argumentative dis-
course (Mercier and Sperber 2001, Reboul 2017, D’Agostini 2010), that, in itself, is essentially 
pragmatic in nature. Arguing means justifying conclusions reached starting from the premises, 
i.e. the arguments introduced in order to define the cognoscitive background of interlocutors 
and the topics of the discourse. The effectiveness of an argumentation is, therefore, something 
different from its truthfulness as referentiality, i.e. the ability of an expression to be applied 
to individuals or a state of affairs. If we are on the right track, we expect that argumentative 
discourse should have an identifiable illocutionary force (Austin 1962), such as, for instance, 
persuasion, on a par with other types of act, e.g. request, order, promise. In political discourse a 
key role pertains to argumentative procedures insofar as they confirm and enrich the belief and 
conviction system of the recipients. However, the argumentative texture of political discourse 
is frequently elliptic, insofar as it exploits the hidden logic introduced by implicatures, i.e. the 
ability of utterances to enhance the information provided by linguistic expressions by means 
of the contents evoked and implicated by the communicative context (Grice 1993 [1975], 
Sperber and Wilson 1996). 
Argumentative organization is able to define the premises and justifications in favor of 
the veracity and strength of the thesis, thus prompting the recipients to opt for a politician, 
an object or idea. Even if this is not always the case in ordinary discussion between persons or 
political oratory, nevertheless there are examples of language structured on the basis of arguments 
supporting the thesis and justifications of sorts. An emblematic case is the discourse announcing 
the decision of Silvio Berlusconi to participate in the political struggle in 1994, in (2):
(2)   a.   L'Italia è il Paese che amo. Qui ho le mie radici, le mie speranze, i miei orizzonti. Qui ho im- 
 parato, da mio padre e dalla vita, il mio mestiere di imprenditore.
  ‘Italy is the country that I love. Here I have my roots my hopes, my horizons. Here I learnt, 
 from my father and life, my profession as a businessman.’
 b.  Qui ho appreso la passione per la libertà. Ho scelto di scendere in campo e di occu- 
 parmi della cosa pubblica perché non voglio vivere in un Paese illiberale, governato da forze 
 immature e da uomini legati a doppio filo a un passato politicamente ed economicamente fallimentare.
  ‘Here I learnt the passion for freedom. I chose to take to the arena and enter public affairs 
 because I do not want to live in an illiberal country, governed by immature forces and by men 
 closely tied to a politically and economically unsuccessful past.’ 
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 c.   Per poter compiere questa nuova scelta di vita, ho rassegnato oggi stesso le mie dimissioni da 
 ogni carica sociale nel gruppo che ho fondato. Rinuncio dunque al mio ruolo di editore e di 
 imprenditore per mettere la mia esperienza e tutto il mio impegno a disposizione di una battaglia 
 in cui credo con assoluta convinzione e con la più grande fermezza.
  ‘In order to make this new choice in life, I resigned this very day from every official position 
 I held in the group of companies I set up. I am resigning my role as publisher and businessman 
 to offer my experience and all my commitment in favor of a struggle in which I believe with 
 total conviction and firmness.’
In (2), (a) is the premise circumscribing the symbolic universe of the politician and fixes 
the boundaries of agreement with the audience; what we see are statements entirely based on 
confidence in the sender: what is more important than a father, roots of one’s own life, one’s pro-
fession? Obviously these are apodictic topoi unfailingly common to and approved by all people. 
(b) sets the target, the thesis, i.e. ‘to enter public affairs’ as a historical necessity, in relation to 
the “passion for freedom” and other supporting arguments. (c) introduces further justifications 
and motivations in support. Each paragraph in turn takes on the form of an argumentation, 
where the main thesis, Italy is the country that I love in (a), I chose to take to the arena and enter 
public affairs in (b) and a struggle in which I believe with total conviction and firmness in (c), are 
supported by motivating or justifying propositions. For instance, (c) may be construed as in 
(2’), where (2’i) introduces the thesis, justified by other propositions: 
(2’) i. I make a new choice in life: political struggle 
 ii. This requires total dedication and commitment
 iii. I resigned from every official position I held
 iv. The struggle is tackled with conviction and firmness
More to the point, not verbalized and someway hidden interpretive factors come into 
play, i.e. presuppositions and, more crucially, pragmatic implicatures (Sperber and Wilson 
1996). These additive but not less important meanings, generally triggered in ordinary speech, 
become crucial in political discourse. So, in (2’), a lexical choice such as ‘struggle’, a rather 
conventional metaphor concerning political debate, introduces the presupposition that there 
are enemies taking part in the struggle, and that the nature of a struggle is such as to require 
‘total dedication’. The implicature is that the total dedication of his life is in the interest of the 
people. The appropriateness of (2’i) depends on the probability of realization. According to 
D’Agostini (2010) the effectiveness of an argumentation is determined by combining the two 
properties of validity and truth, that make it persuasive. 
An interesting point is that argumentation, although someway implemented by premises, 
justifications and conclusion, is frequently undermined by rhetorical fallacies, so that the true 
means are almost totally implicit and carried out by what is implicated in the discourse. It is 
the symbolic and cognitive universe shared by the audience that provides the interpretation. For 
example, in (2), the arguments a. Italy is the country that I love and b. Here I learnt the passion 
for freedom do not justify the conclusion concerning the necessity of ‘taking to the arena’ on 
the part of Berlusconi. In the sense that there is no consequentiality between (2a)-(2b) and 
the decision of Berlusconi: what is important is the implicit content activated by implicatures 
(Lombardi Vallauri and Masia 2014), as for instance that this choice is the guarantee in order 
to prevent a possible success of the left-wing parties. 
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3.1 Words and worlds: expressive language for persuading
Much political discourse is based on partial or fallacious argumentations, i.e. argumentations 
starting from dogmatic or asserted premises involving adhesion on the part of the audience. Gen-
erally, this approach is strongly emotional and inclusive. A classical instance is the evocation of a 
conspiracy, a key for opening up an alternative world. A different type of power, different beliefs and 
values are dreamed of and pursued in crisis periods, when the rules of traditional power are negated 
or questioned. The political symbols and discourse are not particularly interested in the veridicality, 
evoking or envisaging different moral or social conditions, as highlighted by Saussure (2005: 124):
[…] economic recession, war, and post-war situations are factors that favor less stable moral judgement 
for individuals and open the way for a change in moral values. The fact is that when a society or system has 
not been able to provide appropriate quality of life and the possibility of human relations, individuals are 
likely to conclude that the values that ground that particular society or system are not appropriate. This 
plants the seed of doubt and the will to change societal conditions. Needless to say, such change is not trivial.
Conspiracy thinking is a powerful tool for attacking the social order. The phantom of a 
conspiracy aimed at annihilating European peoples (white? Aryan?) has been taken up with 
particular insistence by the Italian Lega, under the leadership of Matteo Salvini, who, during the 
gathering of the Italian public holiday of 15 August 2015, in Ponte di Legno (Valtellina, Northern 
Lombardy), denounced the tentativo di genocidio (attempt of genocide) of the populations who 
live in Italy, supplanting them with decine di migliaia (tens of thousands) of people coming from 
abroad. Similarly, in his live broadcast on Radio Padania on 15.5.2017, in (3), he describes the 
essential steps of the Kalergi plan,2 which assumes that any incentive for immigration in Europe 
would have as its main purpose the replacement of its population: 
(3) Vedremo di adottare ogni mezzo possibile, oltre a quelli che già abbiamo percorso, per fermare questa 
invasione. E quando dico ogni mezzo dico ogni mezzo, ovviamente legalmente permesso o quasi, 
perché siamo di fronte a un tentativo evidente di pulizia etnica, di sostituzione etnica ai danni di chi 
vive in Italia. (Matteo Salvini, Radio Padania 15.5.2017, Post 15.5.2017)
 ‘We will try to deploy any possible means; besides those we have already used, in order to block this 
invasion. And when I say any means I say any means; obviously legally permitted or nearly so, since 
we face an evident attempt at ethnic cleansing, ethnic substitution harming those who live in Italy.’ 
If we explore the grammar of this text (Caiani and Della Porta 2011), we see that certain gram-
matical roles encode ideological and symbolic values. The plot is lexicalized by indefiniteness, whereby, 
for instance, the agentive argument of the eventive noun ‘attempt’ is omitted (Danler 2005). Who 
uses these expressions knows that their efficacy resides in evoking the innermost feelings, here the 
fears of the individual, and the completeness of the argumental structure is unnecessary in order to 
obtain this result. Indeed, a certain degree of vagueness increases the communicative power of these 
sentences. On the other hand, the impossibility of resorting to definite descriptions, endowed with 
referential content, betrays the artificiality of the semantic construction. 
Not applying an overt argumentative structure, traditionally tied to the slogans and claims 
of politicians and parties, is now increasing as a general way to communicate ideas through social 
2 The Austrian-Japanese politician and philosopher Richard Nikolaus Coudenhove-Kalergi was one of the 
founders of European integration. Extreme right-wing forces and Lega attribute to him a plot for replacing the 
European populations with Asian and African immigrants (Quattrociocchi and Vicini 2016). 
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media such as Twitter and Facebook. The short-circuit between media and degree of truth is a 
consequence of the fact that the new social media are intrinsically available to the uncontrolled 
and unconditioned expression of ideas and opinions by the individual. Interestingly D’Agostini 
(2010) and Ferraris (2017) warn that a new type of absolutism is born, that is assertions devoid 
of falsifiability, new true dogmas. As to politicians, they know that proposing truths alternative 
to the established ones leads to the triggering of the innermost feelings and fears of individuals, 
and for this reason, it is very powerful. The symbolic world alternative to European politics, 
globalization, immigration processes, recognition of civil rights, is the final thesis shared with the 
audience. It is suggested in the attacks on the establishment, presented as inaccessible, a cluster 
of lobbies and interests extraneous to the citizens. In the extreme right, ethno-pluralism and 
securitarian, racist/xenophobic components are involved (Rydgren 2008), whereas in the case 
of left-wing ideologies, the economic powers of the multinationals and international finance 
have inspired political controversy for decades (cf. Ventrone 2005).
Let us begin with the strategy adopted in order to depict the imagined relation between 
a supra-national power and the individual in some tweets by Matteo Salvini (in (4); from the 
corpus in Giovinazzo 2020) in the years preceding the government of 2018: 
(4) a.  In Europa comandano banchieri, finanzieri e massoni, è presa d’atto. Io sto dall’altra parte 
  (29.5.2016)
  ‘In Europe it is the bankers, the financiers and freemasons that are in charge. I am on the 
  other side.’
 b.  Ma dove siamo finiti in Italia? Libertà per i nostri simboli e la nostra cultura. No al  pensiero 
  unico! (23.9.2016)
  ‘But where have we ended up in Italy? Freedom for our symbols and our culture. No  conventional 
  wisdom.’
 c.  Che Futuro abbiamo in testa? Partiamo dalla difesa delle nostre RADICI, dalla nostra tradizione 
  e dalla nostra cultura (24.2.2018)
  ‘What Future do we have in our heads? Let us start from the defence of our Roots, our traditions 
  and our culture.’ 
Two issues are recalled, encompassing crucial ideological contents: the real nature of Europe, 
otherwise kept hidden by the establishment, in (4a), and the notion of freedom, understood as an 
ethnocentric consideration of the cultural specificity of Italians, (in 4b,c). Freedom and culture in-
troduce an alternative interpretation compared with the one generally advanced by the pro-Europe 
faction and at least by a part of liberal, progressive thought. In (4) they have a very precise reference 
to ethnic separation from the culture of migrants and the political design followed by the European 
Union, and to the alleged different ways of thinking of Italians. The Tweets in (4b,c) clarify this 
implicit level by detailing the fundamental points with recourse to key-words such as Italy, symbols, 
conventional wisdom (also known as pensée unique), future, roots, sufficient to evoke the deep fears, 
values and attachment of the audience. 
Impoliteness is a rhetorical device frequently adopted in the recent political debate. It, together 
with the assertive and apodictic force of the type of messages, may be connected with the contrast 
between powerful and powerless speech, where generally powerful speech is devoid of the discursive 
forms of attenuation or uncertainty, as disclaimers and indefinite expressions. In this line, “emo-
tionally charged words” (Perloff 2003: 202) increase the persuasive power of language, so that the 
argumentative weakness of the exclamatory expressions can turn out to function as a special form 
of intense language insofar as it activates subliminal meanings and other symbolic values. By way 
of example, the lexicon of Beppe Grillo, the head of the so-called Five Star Movement, is character-
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ized by a mix of political technicalities, semantic changes - ‘democracy’ means ‘direct democracy’ 
- and metaphors, including a large use of profanities. Petrilli (2018) notes the high frequency of 
scurrilous, insulting and “bad” language , such as fuck, ass, shit, combined with or alternating with 
descriptive terms such as previous offender, mouse, pig, bitch, dwarf, talk, army, Bocconi (i.e. from a 
privileged background) student, populism (Ondelli, 2016). Resorting to an irrational categorization 
of politicians by means of scurrilous metaphors creates a debate which is only apparent, based on 
the identity of thought between the leader and his followers. These irrational properties occurring 
in Grillo’s discourse are also manifested in the use of insulting terms applied to the opponents, no 
longer indicated by their name but designed with disqualifying and ethical metaphors, such as 
psiconano ‘psycho-dwarf ’ (Berlusconi), ebetino ‘little idiot’ (Renzi), Big Loden (i.e. a reference to the 
smart conventional overcoat worn by ex-Premier Monti). Conceptual frames are triggered, and, for 
instance, Big Loden implicates the formal world of Bocconi the prestigious private university in 
Milan, the social and directive position of the élites, distance from the common people.
Even the public discourse of Salvini often includes forms of coercive impoliteness (Culpeper 
2011) exploiting vulgar expressions, and offensive terms. As noted for Grillo’s rhetoric, impolite and 
vulgar expressions can be a powerful instrument of rupture with the values of civil life, denying the 
current state of affairs and introducing a different social and moral view based on hidden or uncon-
scious feelings. The few examples we will examine are provided by the messages written by Matteo 
Salvini, the Lega secretary, on Twitter and other social media (cf. Baldi, Franco and Savoia 2019). 
What is interesting is that they translate the same contents as the ones in (4) into a vulgar language 
intended to reach and directly affect the people’s cultural and emotional space and implicit thought. 
These messages consist of claims introducing the tassels of an allusive and embracing symbolic system 
immediately reached by means of the communicative effectiveness of sexual or scatological expressions. 
The latter behave like other metaphors, i.e. they open a frame of connected semantic representations. 
The excerpts in (5) (from Ondelli 2017, 2018) illustrate the assertive style in messages imme-
diately introducing that deep cultural humus, including the patriarchal/natural style of life, (5a,b), 
the fears engendered by diversity, (5a,c), the connection of civil and personal liberties to personal 
responsibility and identity, (5b), and suspicion of conspiracies against the “pure” identity of a given 
nation (Caiani 2011) suggested by migratory and globalization processes, (5c). 
(5)  a. … la cultura unica, la scuola unica, la magistratura unica. Che palle. Piccolo è bello, 
  diverso è bello! 
  ‘A single culture, a single school, a single judiciary. Bollocks. Small is fine, different 
  is fine!’ 
 b.  No, diritti a tutti un par de palle. Se tu non rispetti l’essere umano io non ti do mezzo diritto. 
  ‘No, rights for everybody – my ass! If you don’t respect human beings I won’t even give you 
  half a right.’
 c.  Stiamo subendo una sostituzione etnica programmata
  ‘We are undergoing programmed ethnic substitution.’ (Twitter 3.12.2017)
 d.  Perché l’Europa è infame, perché la moneta unica è l’anticamera del pensiero unico... 
  ‘Because Europe is infamous, because a single currency is the prelude to single thought (i.e. 
  pensée unique)...
 e.  Vaffanculo Bruxelles e tutti i burocrati! Dalla Merkel all’euro, a questa gentaglia che vuole 
  comprarci e ci vuole schiavi!
  ‘Fuck off Brussels and all bureaucrats! From Merkel to the Euro, to the mob who want to buy 
  us and make us slaves!’
The ‘single thought’ attributed to Europe is rejected in the name of different national cul-
tures. The recourse to coarse expressions replaces the motivations introducing a direct identity 
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recall for all people that share the same values. In other words, profanity is a fi gurative means 
endowed with several positive eff ects, substantially able to introduce a direct call to common 
feelings. Th e exclamatory structure excludes the predicative part of the clause, i.e. the argu-
mentation supporting the thesis; similar to vocatives and allocution formulas, exclamatory 
sentences have a syntactic organization that lacks the representation of the event, as in ‘Fuck 
off  Brussels and all bureaucrats!’. Th e consequence is that only the symbolic and perlocutionary 
delegitimizing intentions and their expected eff ects support the lexical designation of the enemy. 
Nevertheless, what is the real conclusion? In (3a) the exclamatory status of the thesis “Small is 
fi ne, diff erent is fi ne” suggests that what is presupposed by ‘single’, is the conventional wisdom 
favored by the economic and political establishment, contrasting with small, diff erent values 
underlying “the search for identity”. Th e use of coarse expressions thus becomes a link with all 
people that share the same values, by manifesting its disquiet. 
“Ethno-pluralism” characterizes right-wing ideologies, according to which each commu-
nity must remain separate in order to preserve their national identity (Rydgren 2008). Italian 
extreme right-wing discourse depicts the fear of globalization in documents such as Foglio di 
lotta (A Pamphlet on Struggle) of Forza Nuova, the Veneto Fronte Skinhead VFS network, 
and l’Inferocito (Th e Enraged) of Camerata Virtuale (i.e. the Fascist equivalent of Comrade) 
where external, mysterious and indefi nite conspiratorial factors are involved intent on creating 
an “undiff erentiated, atomized, consumerist society” (Caiani 2011: 140). In the plot in (6) be-
low, Caiani shows the 12 most recurrent actors (among 200 in total) that represent the fi gures, 
entities and situations engaged in a global fi ght for power. 
(6)
It may be interesting to compare the rhetorical and semantic procedures of the right-wing 
with the conspiracy thinking of the left (Baldi, Franco and Savoia 2019). An electoral poster of 
1976 by Democrazia Proletaria (Proletarian Democracy), an extreme left-wing party, equated 
Democrazia Cristiana and State violence inspired a long propagandistic constant of PCI the 
Italian Communist Party. Th e list of the responsibilities and the alleged plots and conspiracies 
attributed to DC also included the instrumentalization and manipulation of terrorist groups 
such as the Brigate Rosse and Nuclei Armati Proletari, as in (7) (Ventrone 2005: 242). Th e role 
of conspiratorial thinking is one of the dangerous drifts denounced in Pombeni (2018) as regards 
Table 1. Th e 12 most recurrent actors in a global fi ght for power (Caiani 2011:140)
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the libertarian ideals of 1968, ultimately leading to the dogmatic tone of the communiqués of 
the Red Brigades. Crippled information and hate as political praxis shown in the anti-system 
formations (Lotta Continua, Brigate Rosse, Nuclei Armati Rivoluzionari, etc.) today no longer 
needs underground presses or gathering places.
(7)
 ‘What the D.C. conceals
 building speculation - mafi a – fatal accidents in workplaces - murders in the streets – illegal capital 
transfers - emigration - Fascist plots and State massacres - psychiatric hospitals and concentration 
camp-hospitals - preventive detention - SID (secret service) - newspapers’ concentration - jobles-
sness - Fascist laws on abortion - bureaucracy - police special laws - pre-electoral armed groups (Red 
Brigades, Proletarian armed nuclei) - For an alternative to DC violence
 vote Proletarian Democracy’
As we note, some referential domains are similar in left- and right-wing positions however 
pointing out the role of obscure economic and external forces presented as a motivating mythol-
ogy. Resorting to the rhetorical artifi ce of the conspiracy by occult powers and, in some cases, 
the same supranational entities, is a strategy shared by opposite extreme ideological positions 
(van Prooijen et al. 2015: 576):
One might speculate that the extreme ‘left’ particularly perceives conspiracies about issues concer-
ning – for instance – capitalism (e.g., multinationals), and that the extreme ‘right’ particularly perceives 
conspiracies about topics such as science (e.g., evolution and climate change) or immigration. Research 
confi rms that specifi c ideologies may drive specifi c conspiracy theories […] More important for the 
present purposes, however, is the observation that both extremes share a general proneness to conspiracy 
beliefs about societal events.
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Coming back now to the new media, the latter make individual, uncontrolled and emotional 
forms of communications possible. Hate speech, fake news and other delegitimizing rhetorical 
tools occur within the messages in social media on the part of politicians, providing the pragmatics 
of delegitimization of the opponent with a formerly unknown strong power of expression and 
dissemination through which they contribute to re-shaping reality and introducing an alterna-
tive representation of facts. Indeed, the reduced argumentation enabled by social media favours 
contents entirely based on the immediate expression of opinions and feelings, easily interpreted 
by the recipients, thus proposing alternatives to the knowledge legitimized by the power of the 
educated élites and by the socially recognized interpretation of the world. An unstoppable swarm 
of unfalsifi able messages gives rise to representations of reality and society diff erent from those 
consciously controlled by the institutions and instruments available in Democratic states. 
All in all, lexical choices, as highlighted by content analysis, are able to circumscribe the symbolic 
world of the politician. Th is possibility is exploited by politicians insofar as the very act of using 
specifi c terms is an important value, a sort of password, creating a covert and negotiable relation with 
experiences and beliefs. Vocal passwords function, ultimately, like other visual or concrete devices, in 
this, leaving out the predicative reading of actions and events. Let us briefl y consider the frequency 
of the lexical elements in a wide corpus of documents written by Matteo Renzi from 2012 to 2016 
presented in Pratellesi (2016: 4).3 Th e research dealt with the speeches by Renzi, starting from 
the initial phase, where he proposed himself as the rottamatore ‘demolisher’, reaching a period of 
Government and the next one, entirely devoted to the Constitutional Referendum concerning the 
setting up of a single chamber parliament and the electoral law. Th e semantic arrangement of Renzi’s 
discourses is crucial insofar as the Referendum contents involve delicate and structural elements of 
Italian democratic organization. So, they are oriented to establish and manifest the symbolic com-
ponents of the new foreshadowed system. Th e diff erences among the three phases are identifi ed on 
the basis of the frequency of some terms, able to represent the evolution schematized in the plots 
(Wordle) in (8a), demolisher (rottamatore), (8c), government, (8b), referendum:
(8)  a. Demolisher (Rottamatore)
3 Th e frequency analysis of the lexical items in this corpus has been applied under the direction of Alessandro 
Lenci in the Computational Linguistics Laboratory of the University of Pisa. 
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 b. Government
 c. Referendum
In (8a) the stress is on ‘public fi nancing for parties’, ‘change’, ‘old’ vs ‘new’, i.e. all values 
of a strongly critical and anti-politics movement. In (8b), when Renzi was the head of the 
government, the values are ‘job’, ‘Europe’, ‘school’, ‘future and reform’. Finally, (8c) focuses 
on ‘changing the country’ and ‘constructing the future’ (Pratellesi 2016). Th ese diff erences 
also infl uence the frequency distribution of the slogan-words used by Renzi, such as owls – the 
dehumanizing metaphor applied to the critics of his political action as the head of government 
(see section 5.1) – reform, demolishing, left, which, as shown in (9), have very diff erent occur-
rences among the phases. Moreover, the referendum tends to eliminate all the polemical and 
identitarian references, such as owls, reform and left, abandoning the storytelling linked with 
overt ideological worldviews and favouring a more inclusive approach.
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(9)             owls              reform            scrapping           left
Th e discussion in the present section has focused on the diff erent non-argumentative mo-
dalities that political discourse puts in place as interpretive devices addressed to the audience. 
Th e quest for elementary and, together, strongly evoking linguistic tools and expressions is 
generally also refl ected in the structure of sentences. So, the linguistic and expressive choices of 
Matteo Salvini are limited in comparison both with Italian political rhetoric and also with the 
rich and articulate speech of Berlusconi and Renzi (Ondelli 2018). Th is property can be due 
to the prevalent use of tweets and posts on Facebook, however like other 5S politicians such 
as Luigi Di Maio; in this context, his way of speaking is congenial to the pragmatic modalities 
of social networks. Th e point is that the measure of the readability of his speeches done with 
Corrige! (Readability index and lexical fi lter) reveals that Salvini’s speeches are the easiest to un-
derstand even for the people who have a Middle school diploma: the Gulpease index is 62 for 
Salvini compared to 56 for Renzi (the value 100 indicates the highest readability and the value 
0 the lowest readability; Lucisano and Piemontese 1988). A value lower than 80 is diffi  cult 
to read for those with an elementary diploma. As we saw, Salvini’s short messages on social 
media present facts as apodictic, obvious, and natural, like reality. Th is way of communicating 
gives rise to an emotional type of truth as a typical cognitive abbreviation that combines, at 
least, two properties: expressing judgments and conclusions without providing arguments, and 
suggesting common belonging.
4. Symbols 
Symbols are one among the main fi lters through which we assign a meaning to the things 
around us and we are able to interpret reality. More precisely, the knowledge of the world is 
organized by means of symbols, including linguistic expressions, based on a genetically fi xed 
human faculty, as well as other symbolic systems, just as gestures and other visual tools and the 
wide system of cultural symbols linked to the attitudes and imaginary of particular communities. 
Politics does not escape this human capability of translating and incorporating knowledge into 
symbolic forms: gestures, imagines, colors, pictures, designs, meaning-full objects, posturing, 
the manner of behaving and speaking. It is political discourse that creates an irreplaceable 
symbolic force. A crucial property of political discourse is the ability to replace the experience 
of reality with its representation by means of semantics, symbols and beliefs of the recipient. 
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Authors such as Edelman, Lasswell, and Kaplan, highlight the role played by the values 
sharing and “preexisting predispositions” (Cavazza 2002: 790), which symbols represent by 
disregarding rational or utilitarian considerations. One solution instead of another, one pho-
to rather than others, act as symbolic devices insofar as they convey more general contents 
concerning society, its fears, its expectations and myths, and cause deep, not necessarily overt, 
adhesion. Th e spectacularization of politics which derives from this has meant the enhance-
ment of the symbolic import of actions, behaviors and clothing. Th e body, posturing, gestures, 
dress has always played a role in human history, at least in the contrast between the natural 
and political body, where the fi rst is fragile and perishable while the second is imagined and 
represented (Parotto 2007). 
Emblematic cases are numerous, starting from Matteo Renzi, while still mayor of Flo-
rence, who in 2013 appeared in a popular television show dressed as Fonzie, (in (10)), the 
hero of the television series of the eighties, Happy Days, the rebel boy, loved by teenagers, 
who was self-confi dent but respectful of values: Renzi was one of them, with the same desires 
and expectations. Like Fonzie, he wanted to rebel against the distortion or the betrayal of the 
behaviors perceived as right and shared among people, in compliance with the fundamental 
principles of a traditional morality. 
(10)
Here emerges the rhetoric of anti-politics, the search for symbols and meanings apparently 
as far as possible away from the traditional semantic spaces of politics. Th ey are, ultimately, 
symbols evoking pre-political contents with which engaging in politics and politically commu-
nicating are imbued. After all, the representation of the body of the leader as the symbol of a 
particular worldview was already widely implemented by other political leaders. A well-known 
example is the bandana worn by Silvio Berlusconi in (11), in the meeting with Mr. and Mrs. 
Blair in his villa in Sardinia, in August, 2004. 
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(11)
Th e contradiction between one’s own identity and the new, public, interpretation can refer 
to the analysis in Goff man (1959, 1967), whereby the self-representation of persons, the face 
shown, responds to social attributes acknowledged and understood by others: 
Th e term face may be defi ned as the positive social value a person eff ectively claims for himself by 
the line others assume he has taken during a particular contact. Face is an image of self-delineated in 
terms of approved social attributes - albeit an image that others may share, as when a person makes a 
good showing for his profession or religion by making a good showing for himself. (Goff man 1967: 5) 
Body, gestures and clothing of the political leader are typically connected with the ritual-
istic manifestation of totalitarian or despotic organizations. On the contrary, these signs also 
provide a crucial source of interpretive tools in democratic states, besides, naturally, the level 
of ordinary interpersonal relations. As well as language, images and other physical signs give 
shape to the contents of knowledge, culture and society (Cassirer 1944). Meaning takes form 
in recognizing themselves in the same face, in sharing the value of determined social attributes. 
What is interesting is how physical symbols manifest the changes in the persons’ way of feeling. 
So, the powerful head of the Democrazia Cristiana (Christian Democracy) party Aldo Moro 
in (12), shows himself in suits and ties in any situation, including the beach, thus preserving 
the message of a substantial ideal remoteness of politicians from other citizens, and as a sign of 
respect for the common values of discretion and severity. Th e seriousness of behavior – offi  cial 
locations and dress representing social distinction – is an important symbolic system put in 
place by the economic, political and cultural establishment.
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(12)
New symbols for new values are now dominant. Th e photos in (13a, b) illustrate the ne-
gation of the alterity or the professionalism of politicians that inspires the myth of politicians 
as common people. Th e semantic space goes from the immediate identifi cation with common 
behaviour through the signs of the way of dressing and gesturing, to the abandonment of the 
more formal signs, such as the tie. So, in summer 2019 the then Minister of  Internal Aff airs 
and secretary of the Lega party, Matteo Salvini, in the beach resort Papeete at Milano Marit-
tima, makes political statements while showing himself as a bather engaged in fun activities.
(13)
  a.              b.
         
Analogously, even if the desecration is less explicit, taking off  one’s tie is a sign of closeness 
to the people. Renzi, in announcing the creation of the party Italia Viva in September 2019, in 
(14), presents himself without this distinctive sign, and Di Maio, in (15), the Foreign Ministry 
of Italy, takes off  his tie in a meeting of his party, the Movimento 5 Stelle in February 2020, in 
order to signify his belonging to the common persons.
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(14)                (15)
Clothing, gestures, bodies recall the common values and belief universe of the common 
people, the popular classes, a new undetermined crowd, a sort of “all we” only united by di-
strust of politicians. 
A call to recondite but identity meanings deeply rooted in a particular tradition of thought 
is introduced in gesture and posture. Th e examples in (16) and (17) are telling. In the poster 
in (16) – 2010 communication campaign – the then secretary of the Democratic Party (PD), 
Luigi Bersani is photographed in a calm pose, without a jacket and with a tie and his sleeves 
rolled up. Th e caption says: ‘For better days’. ‘Roll up our sleeves’. Everything in this picture 
suggests calm and rationality, promising better times. Th e tie recalls the institutional role of the 
politician, suggesting reliability and self-consciousness. However, traditional and old meanings 
of the left-wing are introduced by the rolled up sleeves, a subtle but not insignifi cant and ne-
gligible reminder of Giovanni Pellizza da Volpedo’s Quarto Stato painting, where the rolled up 
sleeves characterize the manner of dressing of proletarians, workmen and artisans. Th e secular 
creed of the left-wing is celebrated in this way. 
(16)      (17)
On the other hand, in several electoral meetings the leader of the Lega Matteo Salvini holds a 
Rosary, in the photo in (17), as the symbol of fi delity to the Catholic tradition and vindication of a 
society preserving its identity against the danger of religious and ethnic replacement. Th e reference 
to basic values is triggered, this time in an overt and fl aunted way, with the eff ect of multiplying 
implicatures such as the threat caused by the imagined number of migrants with a diff erent culture, 
religion and language. Th e messages on Twitter accompany the gestures, spelling out this important 
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semantic nucleus of the persuasive strategy of Salvini, as illustrated in (18), connecting it with an 
ethnic approach to migration and, crucially, with the rejection of an intellectualistic attitude towards 
the obscuration of its own tradition.
(18) Secondo qualche radical chic indossare il crocifi sso “fa impressione”. Sì al velo, no alla 
croce. Siamoalla follia (19.06.2019) (from Giovinazzo 2020)
 ‘According to some radical chic individuals to wear a crucifi x is “disturbing”. Yes to the 
veil, not to the cross. Th is is madness’ 
Th e synthetic contraposition between ‘veil’ and ‘cross’ evokes a strong emotional motivation 
justifying the conclusion, ‘Th is is madness’, associated with strong implicatures and experienced 
situations.
Th e incomplete and allusive way of arguing favoured by social media is however not substantially 
diff erent from the traditional style of advertising and political posters in electoral campaigns. In other 
words, the recourse to what is already felt by persons and included in their symbolic universe is an 
essential mechanism of persuasion. Not by accident, Chilton (2005) speaks of “propagation” rather 
than “propaganda” in political communication, so that what is exhibited is somehow substantially 
present in the symbolic universe of the addressee and only needs to be aroused. So, posters are able 
to introduce and arouse the values of a party (or a brand) by having recourse to few words (mottos 
and watchwords) and images that trigger feelings and ideological affi  liations. 
Let us consider some political posters, all relative to the campaign for the regional elections in 
January 2020, in Emilia the important, rich, industrialized, populous region of Northern Italy. Th e 
focus is on the format and the claim in each poster. (19) is the poster of the Lega, where the image 
of Salvini and of the Emilia candidate Borgonzoni stand out surrounded by the assertion, ‘Stop 
PD! Let us free Emilia-Romagna’, ‘Sunday 26 January vote Lega’. We compare this message with 
the ones conveyed in (21) of PD, ‘Bonaccini President. Emilia Romagna. One step ahead’. and in 
(20) of Movimento 5S ‘Your useful sentinels’. 
(19)         (20)              (21)
Th e target is the symbolic and semantic world of the political subjects:
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(19’): ‘Stop PD! Let us free Emilia-Romagna’ directly identifies the enemy from which the 
 electors must be freed. The evocation of a sort of long term slavery is recalled and put 
 at the centre of interest for the citizens. The politician head of the party, Salvini, ensures 
 the crucial ideological points.
(20’): The message of 5S is evoking the essential narration of this movement, i.e. the need for 
 sentinels vigilant over distortion in political behavior and the administration of public 
 welfare. 
(21’): The storytelling of PD is didactic, suggesting the opportunity of some social or economic 
 progress. 
Any overt argumentative procedure is missing; the main supporting arguments are extra-
linguistic implicatures, the reliability of PD, the ability of Lega in destroying traditional power, 
the obsession of M5S about suspect politicians and accusing the establishment of dishonesty 
in the handling of power. So Lega and M5S have in common self-representation as anti-sys-
tem and anti-caste forces, oriented to subverting the current state of affairs. Voters know that 
behind the vote in Emilia-Romagna, the Lega party aims to cause a government crisis, while 
PD is worried about preserving a sufficient degree of representativeness. An electoral fight is 
the result of a chain of messages, events and narrations that accompany the life of persons. A 
symbolic process that expresses emotions and humors of the (parts of ) society. Crucial symbols 
are mediated by the gestures and the body of politicians. 
A successful argumentation includes validity, i.e. the logical connection between premises 
and conclusion, truth, i.e. the correspondence between the sentences and the world, force, i.e. 
its informational import, relevance of premises and fecundity, i.e. its informational potential 
(D’Agostini 2010). Slogans, claims, and other types of political messages do not instantiate 
these properties. So, in the messages in (16), (18), (19)-(21), validity as logical consequentiality 
is not involved; the conclusion is immediately offered. Nevertheless, force seems to gain from 
the weakness of validity, activating implicatures provided by the context. As far as they are 
familiar to the interlocutors, the common ideological universe as the conclusion of implicit 
argumentation is chosen (Sperber, Wilson 1996: 37). By way of an example, the ultimate thesis 
of (19) is the imagined, dreamed world, suggested by the sentences in (22):
(22) Premise/presupposition: we need new values
 Supporting Arguments: citizens need to be liberated from the long term government of the left-
wing parties/from the corruption and the exaggerated power of politicians/from uncertainty
 Conclusion/implicatures: vote for me because we feel the same way and pursue the same world
Relevance and illocutionary force properties leave out both validity devices, such as syntactic 
connectors, and truth criteria; the latter are overridden by the implicit arguments introduced by 
the reduced syntax of the imperative, immediately involving the speaker and his interlocutors 
or a simple assertion, an exclamation, in turn inducing a direct implicature on the recipient.
5. Metaphors, narrative and lexicon. The interplay of rhetorical tools with images: A single imaginary
Any proposition pronounced in the course of a linguistic interaction puts into play some 
type of persuasion, at least in the minimal sense that the recipient shares the meaning with 
the speaker, and, therefore, her/his cognitive environment is enriched and modified. Thus, 
Danler (2005: 62) highlights that discourse is a “form of power”. The political speech is, in 
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this perspective, the “prototypical discourse as power”, as far as it is aimed at changing or 
enhancing a certain worldview in the audience by means of discursive strategies oriented to 
manipulation and persuasion. These strategies include pragmatic, textual and strictly linguistic 
devices, such as morpho-syntactic, lexical and prosodic choices. Naturally, what is crucial is 
the semantics conveyed, the message as an assemblage of overt and hidden linguistic contents, 
presuppositions and implicatures (Lombardi Vallauri and Masia 2014). 
We will focus on the strategies for obtaining generic and opaque messages, stimulat-
ing immediate adhesion to values and convictions and skipping over eventual evaluative 
procedures put in place by the recipient. For instance, Danler (2005) speaks of habituality, 
contrast and relevance for the present, emphasis of modifiers, avoidance of confrontation 
specifically by means of omission of complements, polarization/obviousness. These devices 
can be connected to the fuzziness effect observed by Saussure (2005), as a crucial tool of 
manipulation in political discourse. A special role is played by metaphors and other figures 
of speech by virtue of their ability to amplify the semantic import of an expression or a text 
giving rise to conceptual blending (Chilton 2005) and interpretive frames. Charteris-Black 
(2005: 13) compares ideology, metaphors and myth as sharing “the expressive potential for 
cognitive and emotional engagement”. Sebera and Lu (2018: 66) note that:
Metaphor within Critical Metaphor Analysis is understood as a linguistic device which can shape 
reality and frame it according to the persuader’s goals, thus connecting their ideological agenda with the 
addressee’s already deep-entrenched worldviews and beliefs on the basis of the pathos invoked by the 
culturally embedded meanings of the metaphors.
Lakoff and Johnson argue that metaphorical representation is actually the way in which we 
conceptualize and categorize abstract experiences. The ability of lexical occurrences, in particular 
metaphoric uses, to project a system of semantic relations has the effect of creating a new seman-
tics substituting the old meanings, or, as Lakoff and Johnson (1999, 1980) note, conceal new 
interpretations of the world and society. A direct correspondence between values and metaphor-
ical concepts follows, and not surprisingly, metaphor is central to language and the ideology of 
politics, which can play an ambiguous role, implying opaque meanings or hidden systems. The 
neo-semantics of the sort introduced by figured uses or by even only subtle, not literal occurrences 
does not necessarily derive from the media. The media generally use it for adhering to a collective 
imagination associated with a political-cultural line or uncritically repeat it. 
According to Gentner and Bowdle (2001), and Bowdle and Gentner (2005) metaphor 
is the result of a cognitive process that establishes correspondences between the partially iso-
morphic conceptual structures associated with two terms. In this sense, metaphor is a source 
of polysemy, as it generates an additional abstract meaning in addition to the literal meaning 
of a term. As they recall, metaphor gives rise to an abstract category that includes both terms, 
with the result that this new category can be conceptualized separately from the original ones 
of the two terms. Even the difference between conventional metaphors and new metaphors, 
considered important by some authors, seems to be devoid of real importance from the point 
of view of interpretation (Bowdle and Gentner 2005; Chilton 2005). The multiplicative effect 
of metaphor is pointed out by Sperber and Wilson (1996) whereby, like the poetic and stylistic 
effect, an expansion of the meaning is obtained by means of implicatures. 
Charteris-Black (2005: 22) recalls that:
However, because metaphor draws on two domains by relating abstract notions to our experience 
of concrete realities, it is an effective way of making an abstract ideology accessible because it is affective. 
benedetta baldi362
Political leaders are usually very effective at making the abstruse and abstract seem personal and responsive 
to real human emotions and it is this skill that enhances their legitimacy. 
The communicative force of metaphors in political discourse is specifically associated 
with (de)legitimization of companions and partners vs opponents and the audience. In fact, 
metaphors are able to place, on the basis of our experience of the world, attitudes and values 
‘on a scale of goodness and badness’ (Charteris-Black 2005: 13-4), thus providing political 
discourse with a semantic instrument able to immediately represent political actors, events, 
facts and beliefs in a positive or negative light. In what follows we will examine three crucial 
points, among others, i.e. the use of narrative texts, metaphors, specifically the ones aiming 
to dehumanize the opponent, and the interplay between discursive tools and images based on 
the same conceptualizations. 
Derogatory metaphors linked with the animalistic representation of politicians is a usual 
shortcut, arguably more efficacious, insofar as it generates the stereotypical frame of connected 
properties. So, in (23), Luigi Di Maio ascribes to then-premier Matteo Renzi the attitude of 
barking.
(23) Mentre dall’Italia #Renzi abbaia verso l’Europa, negli stessi giorni vota un trattato sull’olio tunisino 
che massacra i nostri agricoltori” (Tweet, 22 February 2016) 
 ‘While from Italy #Renzi barks towards Europe, on the same day he votes for a treaty on Tunisian 
olive oil that massacres our farmers’. 
This simple word is sufficient to open an articulated frame in which Renzi is a barking 
dog, implicitly annoying and innocuous, ready to be on the run in the face of difficulties, in 
this case to betray the citizens. What is more, the traditional wisdom expressed by the proverb 
“Barking dogs seldom bite” is implicated. If the strength of metaphors is to open frames, to 
activate a connected semantic framework of events and participants, animalistic figures in po-
litical polemic introduce a severe dehumanizing effect condensing the depreciative properties 
that traditional imaginary and narrative associate with particular animals. 
At this point, the preceding discussion has made it clear that all the different types of 
political communication have a narrative import, introducing schemes of actions where the 
politicians are protagonists, the explicit or implicit deus ex machina. In posters as well as in 
the short tweets, events are narrated and the politician is the agent able to solve the problem, 
to overcome the obstacle. Narrative is essential to political discourse insofar as it is structured 
on the basis of some type of metaphorical frame (Skrynnikova et al. 2017) that drives reading 
of the text. What is more, we can think that a set of interpretive primitives are involved, in 
the manner of the Proppean treatment of the narrative functions in traditional fairy tales, as 
suggested by Lakoff (1972: 147), whereby:
 
[…], we can say with some certainty that people do construct some discourses in much the same 
way that they construct sentences. If people have in their minds a “discourse grammar,” it is certain that 
large segments of that grammar will be shared by people speaking many different languages in many 
scattered lands.
Lakoff surmises that differences in discourse grammar could depend on different world 
views and cultural values, thus explaining the mutual comprehensibility of the popular tales 
semantic organization in the European tradition. Interestingly, Skrynnikova et al. (2017: 288) 
propose the application of the idea of Lakoff (1972) to current political speeches in order to 
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uncover the plot hidden in the narrative. In other words, it is possible to depict the narrated 
event and its participants in terms of an elementary roles, “A set of elementary narratives fre-
quently makes up complex narratives”, such as the protagonist, the antagonist, the helpers, 
etc., and the overcoming of obstacles, with the advantage of evoking traditional values and 
meanings. As an example:
[…] clusters of metaphors employed by the politicians form a specific type of a cultural narrative 
referred to as an extended metaphorical frame. […] a hero walks a long way with many obstacles to his 
destination, losing a minor race, learning his lesson, and going on until he wins. An alternative plot is 
with someone on a quest to overcome a succession of obstacles before getting a chance […]. (Skrynnikova 
et al. 2017: 285, 288)
Indeed, a direct reference to popular fables and their protagonists is not unknown in the 
political debate, insofar as traditional stories are able to typify the personality traits of a person 
in terms of moral and behavioral stereotypes. So, the ancient fable of the Scorpion and the 
Frog4 is used by the Culture Minister Dario Franceschini, in a tweet of 19.2.2020, in (24), as 
a comment on doubts about the endurance of the government expressed by Matteo Renzi – 
the leader of Italia Viva, a small splinter party supporting the government majority – during a 
debate on the TV talk-show “Porta a Porta”. 
(24) Mentre stavano per morire, la rana chiese all’insano ospite il perché del suo folle gesto. Perché sono 
uno scorpione, rispose, è nella mia natura. 
 ‘While they were dying, the frog asked the insane guest the reason for his foolish act. Because I am 
a scorpion, he answered, it is my nature’.
By means of this fable Franceschini points out that the fall would damage Renzi and his 
party as well. An implicit characterization of the politician is suggested, the stereotype of the 
man who is willing to hurt himself to satisfy his own ambitions, like the scorpion that does not 
resist its nature and stings the frog causing death to both. So, cultural tradition provides us with 
a predetermined representational scheme of the moral behaviors of the persons, a collection of 
public and private masks structuring the conceptualization of society and the world. Political 
discourse exploits it as an efficacious tool with the merit of fitting in with the cognitive frame-
work and the conceptualization of the world on the part of the audience. 
The link with the moral values of the cultural tradition explains the crucial role played by 
the shared and traditional ways of representing the event and human actions. In what follows 
we examine longer texts in which the narrative structure and metaphorical frames are based on 
a fundamental scheme in which the protagonist (the politicians) solves problems represented 
by obstacles and unveils deceptions in order to achieve victory. Images and metaphors create a 
particularly deep plot of meanings that people are induced to interpret on the basis of traditional 
and cultural world views and beliefs. 
4 A scorpion, which cannot swim, asks a frog to carry it across a river on the frog’s back. The frog hesitates, 
afraid of being stung by the scorpion, but the scorpion argues that if it did that, they would both drown. The frog 
considers this argument sensible and agrees to carry the scorpion. Midway across the river, the scorpion stings the 
frog anyway, dooming them both. The dying frog asks the scorpion why it stung the frog despite knowing the 
consequence, to which the scorpion replies: “I couldn’t help it. It’s in my nature.
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5.1 De Gasperi vs communists in the 1948 electoral campaign
In the crucial moments of Italian history immediately after the end of the Second World 
War two ideological visions of democracy and civil rules were in contrast giving rise to an intense 
and violent political confrontation. The campaign for the Italian general election in 1948 was 
no holds barred: the Democrazia Cristiana Party, inspired by the ideal of a true western-type 
democracy, focused on the accusation of a plot and duplicity on the part of communists, linked 
with socialists in the Fronte Democratico Popolare (FDP) with Garibaldi as its symbol. The 
Communist Party was a political and socio-economic reality rooted in Italian society; it present-
ed itself as the heir of the ideals of the Resistance and of anti-fascism. The election was lost by 
communists and won by the parties embodying democratic or conservative ideals, determined 
to establish a democratic and free regime, and averse to Bolshevism and Soviet influence. A 
sour confrontation also continued in the following years, thus characterizing important aspects 
of Italian politics.
A cipher of the speeches made by Alcide De Gasperi, the secretary of the Democarazia 
Cristiana Party and by Palmiro Togliatti, the secretary of the Italian Communist Party (cf. 
Baldi and Franco 2015) is the use of metaphors essentially aiming to disparage the adversary, 
occurring inside a prose clear and, at the same time, as Desideri (2011) notes, prescriptive, 
almost didactic. As we saw, metaphor and generally figurative language have important effects 
of sense as far as they are able to provide new meanings, different from both source and target, 
to the people’s conceptual system. Specifically, a typical rhetorical instrument is the use of 
dehumanizing metaphors applying terms designing animals to humans, a procedure related to 
strong ideological motivations and contrasts. A well-known case are the metaphors of “parasites” 
and “noxious bacillus” chosen, in Mein Kampf, by Hitler for naming the Jews (Chilton 2005). 
The bestial metaphors used as referential expressions induce the person(s)-target of metaphor 
to be moved to a sort of no man’s land, devoid of cultural values. This semantic tool in the 
political struggle has a long history in the European political arena, at least from the eighteenth 
century, as shown by Ventrone (2005). The recourse to non-human and beastly linguistic or 
visual representations experienced a resurgence during the terrible, conflictual decades of the 
first half of the twentieth century, albeit maintaining its effectiveness until today.
The use of (dead) metaphors is a classical method aimed at generating systems of meanings 
and evoking positive or negative emotions, as in the language of De Gasperi in the first electoral 
campaign of republican Italy (Cavazza 2002). He presents the political opponent (the Commu-
nist Party and FDP) as an “internal enemy” plotting against the national interest because of its 
being subject to the foreign power of the Soviet Union and Cominform. The internal enemy 
is an alternative to shared values in which the nation is grounded and, therefore, it is devoid 
of legitimacy. So, the delegitimizing strategies serve to frame disturbing and obscure semantics 
alternative to the basic values of the community, as illustrated in the following excerpts in 
(25a, b). This effect is also achieved by means of religious or ethical formulations (indicated in 
bold type), in turn able to bring deep basic feelings to the surface (Desideri 2011). This is the 
case of the metaphor of the “wolf dressed up as a lamb” which was widely used in the election 
campaign. This well-known image from the Gospels served to persuade the electorate of the 
opponent’s treachery (Vinciguerra 2016), implementing a clear didactic function. 
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(25) a. i lupi di ieri si presentano oggi in veste di agnello e accusano noi di portare discordie 
  [...]. E agli elettori diciamo: occhio alla cortina dei gas fumogeni: il Partito comunista per ora 
  si appiatta dietro una certa cortina fumogena che si chiama Fronte popolare, […]La vera forza 
  che sta dietro e manovra è il Partito comunista, il quale ha fatto il lupo fino a ieri e oggi 
  bela di concordia e di pace; ma ormai abbiamo già visto le zanne. Certi discorsi da Mefisto 
  sono inutili: sotto la toga vediamo spuntare lo zoccolo del caprone. (Roma, 15 febbraio 
  1948; De Gasperi 2008, pp. 1150-1155)’
  ‘Yesterday’s wolves come dressed today as lambs and accuse us of breeding discord 
  [...]. We tell the voters this: beware of smokescreens: the Communist Party is lying low for now 
  behind a smokescreen called the Popular Front. […] The real force lurking and manoeuvring 
  from behind is the Communist Party which has played the wolf until yesterday and today 
  bleats of harmony and peace; but by now we’ve seen its fangs. Mephisto can say what he pleases: 
  under the toga we can see the goat’s hoof peeping out.’
 b. mi viene rivolta l’accusa di usare un linguaggio troppo rude: questa accusa, indovinate 
  un po’, mi viene proprio dai comunisti i quali sono soliti misurare le parole e che se nelle aule 
  parlamentari parlano come agnelli, davanti alle folle e quando pubblicano 
  mani fes t i ,  parlano come lupi  rabbiosi .  (Tor ino,  7  marzo 1948; 
  De Gasperi 2008, pp. 1180-1181) ‘I am being accused  of using excessively rough 
  language: this accusation, […], comes straight from communists  who usually 
  measure their words and if in the parliamentary chambers they speak like 
  lambs, before the crowd and when designing posters, they speak like rabid wolves’.
References to the devil at the end of the first excerpt enhance the religious substratum, 
drawing upon people’s deepest feelings and imaginary. Delegitimizing discourse is characterized 
by metaphors denoting sub-human characters, as in the preceding passages, where the term 
rabid wolf/wolves directly introduces the reference to political opponents. Dehumanizing and 
alienating metaphors is a procedure aiming to reshape the symbolic universe of persons and bring 
to light a concealed perception of things. In depicting the ambiguous nature of communists De 
Gasperi resorts to metaphors highlighting their elusive and threatening behaviour. He uses the 
language of military espionage: fifth column (a metaphor adopted since the Spanish Civil War 
in the sense of “traitor”), as in (26a, b, c). The communists are presented as an organization 
inside Italy covertly working and plotting in favour of a foreign invader:
(26) a. non possiamo accettare il principio che da parte del bolscevismo venga organizzata e 
  alimentata una quinta colonna entro la nostra nazione e che faccia una politica diversa da quella 
 che è la politica nazionale (Roma, 15 febbraio; cit. da De Gasperi 2008: 1154).
  ‘We cannot accept the principle that Bolshevism should organize and fuel a fifth column inside 
 our nation or engage in politics different from what is national politics.’
 b.  Ed è contro questa congiura che noi ci siamo levati e abbiamo detto in nome della 
 indipendenza della nostra patria che non possiamo ammettere che si guidino delle quinte 
 colonne da di fuori (Frosinone, 29 marzo; cit. da De Gasperi 2008: 1238).
  ‘We have risen up against this plot, and proclaimed in the name of our homeland’s 
  independence that we cannot allow fifth columns being led from outside’.
 c.  Questo pericolo è particolarmente grave perché tale tentativo non si compirebbe per 
 la forza interna di un movimento nazionale italiano, ma sarebbe la quinta colonna di 
 un movimento più grande (Genova, 11 aprile; cit. da De Gasperi 2008: 1292).
  ‘This peril is serious indeed since such an attempt would not be the inside work of a 
 national Italian movement, but the fifth column of a larger movement.’
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Figurative language provides particular strength to fear and securitarian sentiments just 
by enlarging the semantic space driven by the original metaphor, here fifth column, the mul-
tiplicative effect noted by Chilton (2005). 
An interesting point is that the semantic power of metaphors also comes from a certain 
degree of vagueness and indefiniteness. In other words, metaphors trigger alternative worlds 
stemming from the semantic domain of the source, but simultaneously introduce a particular 
kind of vagueness, left in the hands of the recipients and their cognitive and linguistic abilities. 
Indefiniteness is, we recall, an intrinsic property of communication, with and without language. 
In section 1 we have seen that the notion of “the same language” is in need of explanation. 
Sperber and Wilson (1996: 45, 57) observe:
[…] failures in communication are to be expected: what is mysterious and requires explanation is 
not failure but success. […] We see it as a major challenge for any account of human communication to 
give a precise description and explanation of its vaguer effects. Distinguishing meaning from commu-
nication, accepting that something can be communicated without being strictly speaking meant by the 
communicator or the communicator’s behavior, is a first essential step.
The naive idea whereby the meaning of words is rigorously and univocally defined clashes 
with the fact that words and sentences of languages have by their very nature a meaning at 
least partially undetermined, with grey zones requiring the interpretation of the extra-linguis-
tic context (Jackendoff 1993). So that language does not ensure conceptual tuning between 
interlocutors:
Not only is our conceptualized world our own reality, we constantly check whether it converges 
with everyone else’s. To the degree that we sense that it converges, we take the common view as flowing 
from the “objective character of the world.” On the other hand, to the degree that we sense conflict, 
we are forced to acknowledge subjectivity, and the sense of what is “objective” becomes less stable. (Ja-
ckendoff 2002: 330)
Persuasive discourse, obviously, not only does not escape this property but exploits it, 
inasmuch as, according to Danler (2005), it includes forms of avoidance of confrontation and 
omission, making the real intention of the speaker obscure. Metaphoric expressions seem to 
be able to enhance this type of communication. This also holds for the military jargon used by 
De Gasperi against the communists: employing gas, a smokescreen, shock troops, camouflage, 
outflanking tactics, presenting the opponent as nursing obscure intentions threatening law and 
order, and Italian democracy. 
Posters illustrate this threat in a suggestive metaphoric representation, where the true face 
of communism appears as a skull and unveils a disturbing and threatening semantic frame 
including oppression, army, war, death. The claim “Vote (DC) or (Bolshevism – bringer of 
death) will be your master” in (27) (from Ventrone 2005: 173) dissimulates a destiny of death 
and oppression: the deceit is uncovered:
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(27)
From Ventrone 2005: 173
Th e reduced argumentation of posters is however telling (cf. Ventrone 2005), as in (26’):
(27’) Premise/implicature: there is the risk that the people will not go to vote 
 Supporting Arguments: Bolshevik power is a blood-thirsty master, imperilling the  
 liberty and life of the persons; if you don’t vote Bolshevism can win
 Conclusion: vote against this risk (vote DC)
Th e vagueness of metaphoric and fi gurative expressions gives rise to a sort of disquiet, 
linked to the possible emergence of obscure meanings. As seen, in the campaign of the DC the 
rhetoric of the (Bolshevik) plot inspired and supported the delegitimizing discourse, partially by 
means of metaphors like “fi fth column” and the storytelling focused on the wolf and the lamb. 
Like the skull in (27) (from Ventrone 2005: 171), the wolf under the skin of a lamb reveals 
the true nature of the Communist Party, as in the poster in (28a), where the ironic claim “Th e 
Democratic Front celebrates peace” shows the true value of the word ‘peace’ for communists, in 
so far as a fi erce wolf is hidden under the skin of the lamb, and, again the deceit is uncovered.
(28) a.     b.
                           From Ventrone 2005: 171           
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Th e famous poster in (28b) shows the Communist Party as a wolf that is about to snap a 
ewe, representing a person that does not vote “I do not vote”. Th e caption is a proverb formu-
lated in a dialect of the extreme South of Italy: “Who behaves like a ewe, the wolf eats him/her”. 
Th e use of dialect refl ects the sociolinguistic conditions of the countryside areas, especially in 
the Southern regions, where illiteracy was still very common, with the consequence that many 
persons could not interpret the diff erent messages and be subject to deceptive propaganda, 
or, be induced not to vote. Addressing them in their common language intended to increase 
acknowledgement of the common identity and expectations with the DC, thus increasing the 
self-consciousness of the people. 
Th e image of the wolf unveils the true nature of the communists: they are predators ex-
ploiting the lack of preparation of people in facing the crucial questions involved in the fi rst 
free elections after the war. Th e messages conveyed by the posters translate into images and 
assertions the articulated discourses of the leader. Th e same imaginary is created based on the 
coincidence between metaphors and pictures. Again, dehumanizing images are prevailing in 
the symbolisms adopted by the DC, strongly inspired by two principal ends: to decode the 
messages of communists, by showing the real, true, denotation introduced by the words and 
symbols that they used, and to bring to light their ambiguous nature depriving them of their 
human essence, and their being acceptable adversaries.
Th e point is that Communists, in turn, aimed at evoking the interests of workers, al-
though the relation with the Soviet Union, its regime and its imperialist politics were diffi  cult 
to downplay. Th e posters of FDP put the spotlight on social values such as liberty, peace, work 
and family, on the basis of the common interests between workers and communists. Th e im-
aginary depicted is apparently inspired by traditional values, in some sense, similar to the ones 
of Catholic sensibility, as in the poster in (29a), “For peace, liberty and work. Vote Garibaldi”,
and (29b), “For the defence of the family. Vote for the Italian Communist Party”. where the 
image of a family nucleus, father, mother and child is the physical and ideal core of the poster.
(29)  a.            b.
In other words, they point to the same values the DC appealed to. Th e interpretive level 
is strongly involved, in the sense that the same words and symbols are associated with very 
diff erent semantic universes and ideologies. In fact, we know that lexical elements can be used 
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in connection with diff erent new semantics, implying new interpretations of the world and 
society (Lakoff  and Johnson 1980). According to Bourdieu and Wacquant (2004: 57) semantic 
re-interpretation corresponds to a diff erent way of categorizing society in the terms of opposite 
worldviews. Th e result is that the simple choice of lexical items gives rise to a sort of symbolic 
violence and of a coercive type of communication, from which persons could free themselves, 
only by exercising a conscious critical approach. Also apparently clear terms such as liberty, 
peace and family in the claim of the posters in (29a, b), introduce alternative and ambiguous 
meanings. Liberty and peace in the sense of the communist and socialist regimes in the Soviet 
sphere did not correspond to the semantics of liberty and peace in the states of the Western 
world. Naturally we know that playing on the indeterminacy and ambiguity of the same terms 
is a lexical strategy generally used in political discourse: the interpretation rests on the symbolic 
universe and the referential frames of the audience. Th e same for family, given that the secular 
conception of family is very diff erent from the one of traditional Catholicism supported by 
the DC and conservative parties.
Th e FDP reminds people that the interests it supports are those of the workers, so that it 
suggests that whoever votes Garibaldi votes in his/her own interest (in these elections women were 
voting for the fi rst time), as in (30): “Vote. If you vote for me you vote for you”, Garibaldi says.
(30)
Indefi niteness is the cipher of this type of assertions, tentatively something like the struc-
ture in (29’):
(30’)    Premise:   vote 
     supporting argument: vote for you
     implicatures: your interests are liberty and work, which the Communist Party supports
     conclusion:  Vote for me (the Communist Party/FDP)
Interestingly, the identifi cation between party and elector is a fi gure frequently used. For 
example, the Movimento 5S has recourse to this claim, “Vote (you) for you”, in the Regional 
Election of 2013, as in (31). 
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(31)
Th e strong conceptual simplifi cation catches the eye, any justifi cation and argumentation 
is zeroed, only the assertion or the imperative is preserved. 
5.2 Togliatti’s rhetoric 
Let us turn now to the rhetoric of Togliatti in the years after the 1948 election (Baldi and 
Franco 2015); Desideri (2011) underlines the polemical and scathing nature of the speeches of 
Togliatti. Indeed, in spite of the defeat, Togliatti is conscious of the fact that he is supporting a 
side and a well-rooted thought in society and he wants to challenge his political opponents in 
order to confi rm the strength of the party in society. In his speech in Modena in 1950 (from 
which the excerpt in (32) comes), he aims to activate expectations and a semantic system that 
responds to a widespread identity representation. Th us, Togliatti may foreshadow a future goal, 
in terms generally valid in the presence of a strong and wide sharing of identity, whereby the 
promise of commitment establishes the borders of self-legitimation. Th e speaker knows that 
large parts of the working class and of intellectuals can be referred to as “the healthy forces 
of the Italian people”, in opposition to the interests, often obscure, of liberal forces and of 
economic powers:
(32) Come partito dì avanguardia della classe operaia e del popolo italiano, coscienti della nostra 
forza che ci ha consentito di conchiudere vittoriosamente cento battaglie, ci impegneremo ad una nuova, 
più vasta lotta, in difesa della esistenza, della sicurezza, degli elementari diritti civili dei lavoratori. Ci 
impegniamo a svolgere un’azione tale, di propaganda, di agitazione, di organizzazione, che raccolga 
ed unisca in questa lotta nuovi milioni e milioni di lavoratori, tutte le forze sane del popolo italiano. Ci 
impegniamo a preparare e suscitare un movimento tale, un sussulto proveniente dal più profondo stato 
di cose che grida vendetta al cospetto di Dio. (9/1/1950; from Baldi and Franco 2015: 149)
‘As a vanguard party of the working class and of the Italian people, aware of our strength that allowed 
us to successfully conclude a hundred battles, we are committed to a new, broader struggle in defence of 
life, safety, and basic civil rights of the workers. We will engage in such an action, propaganda, agitation, 
organization, gathering new millions and millions of workers in this fi ght, all the healthy forces of the 
Italian people. We are committed to preparing and launching a movement which rises from the deepest 
state of aff airs, that cries out to heaven for vengeance.’
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The linguistic process of delegitimization of the opponent is the other side of the legit-
imizing narrative presenting oneself as the guarantor and defender of the values threatened 
by the adversary. The pragmatic and morphosyntactic organization reflects the polarization 
(Danler 2005), for example by using we, contrasting with the other forces. The topicalization 
and focusing processes distribute sentential /eventive content in order to associate them with 
the desired information flow, where “As a vanguard party of the working class and of the Italian 
people…” is the topic and the complement of the verb “we are committed to” is the focus. 
What is more, indefiniteness is strong, which who is the speaker that makes the promises, who 
is ‘we’? And what are the ‘action, propaganda, agitation, organization’ promised? 
Togliatti’s speeches aim to “regain legitimacy after a political failure”, i.e. the elections 
of 1948, although, actually, as noted by Smith (2000 [1997]), the Communists and So-
cialists did not convince the population about their having really accepted the democratic 
rules. Baldi and Franco (2015) point out the systematic use of linguistic procedures that 
conceal practices of delegitimization of opponents by recourse to metaphors denoting them 
as sub-human entities, In (33a, b) the participants designed by ‘spectrum’ and ‘chameleon’, 
depicting the two referents in terms of non-human qualities, are initially treated as the subject 
/agent; then, the semantic structure is reversed, and the two metaphors are introduced as a 
predicate, in (33a), or a complement in (33b), restoring the true deep logical order (Baldi 
and Franco 2015: 147, 148).
(33) a. quando tra i presenti a un’assemblea si muove uno spettro, è inevitabile che quello 
 spettro attiri l’attenzione e ad esso ci si rivolga. Onorevole Tesauro, lei qui è lo spettro 
 del regime fascista […]. (8.12.1952)
  ‘when among those who are present in the Assembly, there is a ghost it is inevitable 
 that that ghost draws attention, so that we talk directly to it. Deputy Tesauro (Italian 
 MPs are addressed as ‘Onorevole’), here you are the ghost of the fascist regime’.
 b.  Lascerò da parte le volgarità, gli articoli come quelli che scriveva l’altro giorno un 
 illustre camaleonte, il signor Mario Missiroli, domandandosi che cosa c’è sotto all’at 
 teggiamento dei comunisti […] proprio lui che, per esaltare i Patti del Laterano, scrisse 
 un intiero volume che, si dice, ebbe il personale plauso di Mussolini! È evidente che 
 lezioni di etica da un camaleonte non le prendiamo. (27.3.1947)
  ‘I will leave aside vulgarity, such as the articles that were written the other day by an 
 illustrious chameleon, Mr. Mario Missiroli, wondering what’s underneath the attitude 
 of the Communists [...] the same man who wrote a full volume to exalt the Lateran 
 Pacts, a volume that, it is said, had the personal approval of Mussolini! It is clear that 
 we do not take ethical lessons from a chameleon.
As we saw, metaphors change the cognitive space including the referent by increasing the 
symbolic universe of the individuals with new interpretive nuances that make deep sentiments and 
perceptions surface. So, the figurative term ‘chameleon’ referring to a human being is interpretively 
different both from the use referring to the animal and the generic terms such as ‘opportunist’, 
etc. Analogously, the term ‘spectrum’ implies a being devoid of the human essence. In both cases, 
the first occurrence introduces an effect of vagueness that the speaker eliminates by adding the 
proper name in the following sentence. The strong referential indefiniteness generally introduced 
by figurative expressions allow the speaker to omit the precise information, as typically in political 
discourse (Danler 2005). So, Bettino Craxi (Desideri 1987), in a speech given as Prime Minister, 
in (34), recalled the ambiguous politics of certain left-wing forces in the years of challenges to 
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authority (1968), using the image of “ride the tiger”, a dead metaphor that captures the representa-
tion of obscure and hidden forces that drove and oriented the protests:
(34) […] Riandando con la memoria a quegli anni [i.e. 1968], ricordo che mentre io mi tro-
vavo un po’ spaesato da povero ma incallito riformista quale sono, parti importanti della 
sinistra non esitarono a cavalcare la tigre, a lisciarle il pelo e in qualche caso ad eccitarla. 
(Concluding talk at 43rd Congress of the PSI, Verona, 14.5.1984; from Desideri 1987: 7 
e sgg.)
 ‘Recallig those years, I remember that while I was a little disoriented being a modest but 
inveterate reformist, important parts of the left, did not hesitate to ride the tiger, to caress 
its hair and in some cases to excite it’.
Ventrone (2005) foregrounds the fact that a permanent feature of Italian electoral campaigns 
and generally in the political struggle is the resort to conspiracy theories, as noticed in section 
3.1. Here Craxi hypothesizes and refers to obscure and covert forces underlying the student 
protests and the other protest rallies. The use of the metaphor renders the reference even vaguer 
and, at once, widens the denotational extension of the discourse. 
5.3 A mythical reality 
The narration of facts and experiences as a sort of mythical origin of a community is a tool 
frequently used in defining the content of a strong ideological shaping of society:
A very common way of communicating ideology is through myth. […] Myth engages the hearer by 
providing a narrative that embodies a set of Persuasion, Legitimacy and Leadership beliefs expressing aspects 
of the unconscious. It provides a narrative-based representation of intangible experiences that are evocative 
because they are unconsciously linked to emotions such as sadness, happiness and fear. Its function in 
discourse is to explain with a view either to entertainment or gaining power. (Charteris-Black 2005: 22)
The rhetoric of Mussolini allows us to investigate how political speech can foreshadow or, 
however, depict the birth of new values as a sort of a new sense of life and its basic sentiments and 
beliefs, by means of the narration of shared experiences and emotions. This particular storytelling 
is able to create and confirm belonging to a civil religion of the homeland and its history (Desideri 
1984, 2011). Gentile (1990: 234, 236) characterizes this attitude of fascism as a heritage of the 
ideals of the Italian Risorgimento (the 19th century struggle for National unity), whereby:
What united fascists was not a doctrine but an attitude, an experience of faith, which was concretized 
with the myth of a new ‘religion of the nation […] The initial elements necessary for the formation of a 
‘fascist religion’ were already present in the first phase of the movement, which identified with the myths 
of war and participation it. [...] Mussolini’s charismatic power was notably increased by the institutio-
nalization of fascism as a religion.[…] His meetings with the masses were the highest points of fascist 
worship in which, with appropriate orchestration, one witnessed the emotional fusion of the leader with 
the crowds as a symbolic mystical dramatization of the nation’s unity, achieved through its supreme act. 
The speeches in (35a,b) (Desideri 1984: 54, 55; 91) belong to the beginning of Fascism 
(Gentile 2002). They are very interesting in showing the crucial role of the common cognitive 
and emotive background on which Mussolini builds the new national culture (cf. Desideri 
1984, 2011). The politician represents himself with essential interpretative roles, as an agent 
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of events, an object of evaluation and a guarantee of common identity. The common ground 
is provided by participation in the war and ideals confirmed by this experience aiming at a 
new Italian society: 
(35)  a.  È forse la prima volta nella storia italiana che il Capo del Governo può andare 
  tra la folla tranquillamente senza le preoccupazioni che potevano affliggere certi 
  individui in altri tempi. Sono della vostra razza, ho lo stesso vostro sangue, le stesse 
  vostre virtù e naturalmente gl i  stessi  vostri  difetti .  Appunto 
  per questo si stabilisce tra noi la perfetta comunione degli spiriti: basta 
  che io vi chiami, perché dalle città e dai casolari un coro unanime e formidabile 
  risponda: “Presente!”. (Al popolo di Cremona, 19 giugno 1923; vol. III: 171) 
  ‘Maybe, it is the first time in Italian history that the head of government can 
  mix with the crowd peacefully without the preoccupation that could afflict 
  certain individuals in other times. I am of your race, I have the same blood 
  as you, the same virtues as you and naturally the same faults as you. Just owing 
  to this, a perfect communion of souls is established between us: as long as 
  I call you, a unanimous and formidable choir answers from the towns and 
  farmhouses “Present!” 
  b.  Sono venuto qui non soltanto come Capo del Governo, come Presidente del 
  Consiglio: sono venuto qui soprattutto come vostro compagno di trincea e di 
  sacrificio. Quando io sono dinanzi a voi mi riconosco in voi e rivivo quelle 
  che sono certamente le pagine della mia vita alle quali tengo di più: le 
  pagine della trincea, quando ho potuto vedere col mio occhio il travaglio 
  sanguinoso della stirpe italiana, constatare lo spirito di devozione, vedere come 
  sbocciava dai suoi sedimenti che parevano millenari e perduti, il fiore stupendo 
  della nostra magnifica storia. Ci riconosciamo tutti. Ognuno di noi è certamente 
  stato infangato da quella terribile terra rossa del Carso, ognuno di 
  noi ha sofferto i geli ed i venti delle altitudini alpine, ognuno di noi 
  ha vissuto in dime stichezza quotidiana colla vita e la morte. […] In 
  quest’opera mi è sommo conforto il pensare che non mi manca la solidarietà dei 
  miei compagni di pensiero. 
   (Alla nuova sede dei mutilati, 11 marzo 1923; vol. III: 83, 84) 
  ‘I came here not only as the head of government, as the President of the Council: 
  I came here principally as your companion in the trenches and sacrifice. When 
  I am before you I see myself in you and I relive those that are the pages of 
  my life I really care about: the pages of the trench, when I had the opportunity 
  to see with my own eyes the blood-soaked labor of the Italian lineage, the spirit 
  of devotion, to see how the stupendous flower of our wonderful history sprang 
  forth from its sediments which seemed millenary and lost. We all recognize 
  ourselves. Each of us had surely been smeared by the terrible red earth of the 
  Carso, each of us has suffered frosts and winds of the Alpine altitudes, each 
  of us lived being daily familiar with life and death […] In this work I am 
  comforted by thinking that I enjoy the solidarity of my companions with the 
  same thoughts. 
In (35) the memories and feelings of the war feed a new faith, to which the crowd is called 
to respond “Present!”, in (35a). A new dial sprang from the millenary sediments of Italian 
benedetta baldi374
history. Sacrifice and the reference to the trenches and the blood-soaked labor are metaphors 
that intensify the referential capacity of these speeches. The common race, blood and virtue, 
sealed by sacrifice, are the signs that establish the civil religion of history and war. Again, what 
strikes one in these speeches is the absence of any realistic and concrete topic and the strong 
self-centeredness on the role and the body of the leader. Following Danler (2005) we note that 
the entire text is based on polarization, in the sense that it is obvious that the representation 
of the sacrifices of the war fought for the homeland, ‘our wonderful history’, is the good, and 
the other unmentioned positions are evil. Naturally no confrontation or reflection is developed 
and the rhetorical machinery for emotions is put into practice:
(35’) genericity and omission: certain individuals in other times; as long as I call you, a 
 unanimous and formidable choir answers from the towns and farmhouses “Present!” (what 
 is the aim? who are the persons that say Present?) (35a)
  repetitions, When I am before you I see myself in you…, Each of us had surely been smeared 
 by the terrible red earth of the Carso, each of us …, each of us…, (cf. (35b))
  the identification I/you = we
War is represented as something necessary and essential for the self-consciousness of the people, 
and it is part of the religious-like tone of Mussolini’s speech. Saussure (2005: 128, in analyzing the 
talks of the French right-wing leader, Jean-Marie Le Pen, observes that “religious-like discourse 
plays a very important part in ideological totalitarian manipulation”. The millennialist attitude 
characterizes the foreshadowing of a promised future, that we saw in speeches of Togliatti in (32), 
as well as in celebrating ‘the Italian lineage’ forged by sacrifice by Mussolini in (35a). Moreover, 
in Mussolini’s speeches the audience is depicted as a devoted people, the people made of humble 
soldiers, similar to the humble miners, the excluded to which Le Pen spoke (Saussure 2005). 
Let us turn, finally, to the strategies of delegitimizing communication in speeches by 
political leaders (cf. Baldi and Franco 2014). The following speeches of Mussolini aim to del-
egitimize two actors: the League of Nations (a superordinate actor) and the Ethiopian leaders 
and population (broadly speaking, actors designated as subordinate). A noteworthy property 
of Mussolini’s speeches is his use of polarization as a tool for (de)legitimization, whereby “the 
political speech must make it easy for the listener to identify with one group and to ostracize 
the other” (Danler 2005: 52). By way of polarization Mussolini uses modal verbs and epistemic 
adverbs. To this end, the Italians are associated with events or states of affairs that are taken 
as certain. One discursive strategy is to take an epistemic or deontic expression representing 
Italians and their history in an assertive formula, as in (36a), and (36b), automatically shared 
by the audience, that introduces the judgement on the present time 
(36)  a. Durante i trenta secoli della sua storia l’Italia ha vissuto molte ore memorabili, 
  ma questa di oggi è certamente una delle più solenni 
   ‘During the thirty centuries of its history Italy has had many memorable hours, but 
  this is certainly one of the most solemn’ 
  b.  La loro manifestazione deve dimostrare e dimostra al mondo che Italia e Fascismo 
  costituiscono una identità perfetta, assoluta, inalterabile.
   ‘Their demonstration must and does show the world that Italy and Fascism 
  constitute a perfect, absolute, and unalterable identity’
On the contrary the enemy’s actions are presented as facts, already occurred, supporting 
an evaluative and modal conclusion, as in (37).
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(37)  Il capo e i ras battuti e fuggiaschi non contano più e nessuna forza al mondo potrà 
 mai farli contare. 
  ‘The leader and tribal chiefs beaten and fugitives no longer count and no power on earth can 
 ever make them count.’
This use of language displays one of Mussolini’s political speaking strategies: he gratifies the 
audience by proceeding from uncertainty to certainty, and discredits the enemy by minimiz-
ing the real effect of enemy action. Another interesting feature of Mussolini’s speeches is their 
tendency to move a constituent leftwards (left dislocation), presenting it as topic, something 
known and a part of a shared value system. As noticed, this makes a person or an event obvious 
for the target audience, triggering implicatures of truth and reality, as illustrated in (38a,b,c). 
Left dislocation and the use of aboutness topics contribute to depicting the shared framework, 
the cognitive ground legitimizing the self-consciousness, and delegitimizes whom opposes.
(38)  a.  Con l’EtiopiaTopic abbiamo pazientato 40 anni
    ‘With EthiopiaTopic we had been patient for 40 years
  b.  Durante i trenta secoli della sua storiaTopic l’Italia ha vissuto molte ore memorabili… 
    ‘During the thirty centuries of its historyTopic Italy lived many memorable hours…’
   c.  Con le popolazioni dell’EtiopiaTopic la pace è già un fatto compiuto
    ‘With the Ethiopian populationsTopic peace is already an accomplished fact’
Left dislocation, therefore, enhances the interpretation of a constituent as a part of the 
shared system of beliefs and values, of what is a sort of silent pact between the speaker and the 
audience. If these speeches, aiming at justifying a particular political and military action, are 
compared with the ones in (34), we realize that the true, deep semantic movement is reproduc-
ing and bringing to the consciousness level a general system of values and attitudes. This is the 
Italy of Fascism and its myths, its convictions and its racial biases, grounded in the imagined 
experience of the Roman inheritance (Gentile 2002). 
6. Rhetoric and sentence type: illocutionary externalization
The correspondence between words and world, the typical statements (declaratives and 
assertions), are not the concern of the political way of representing events and the world. On 
the other hand, the rhetorical means give shape to a language evoking imageries and beliefs. Me-
taphors play a crucial role in creating new meanings, thus widening the possible interpretations 
associated with a term or a sentence. Actually, rhetoric has also to do with the way in which the 
sentence externalizes the event and its participants, the arguments of the verb. The syntactic 
organization of the meanings in the terms of the argumental structure of the verb gives rise to 
this interpretive level. The distribution of the grammatical functions and the thematic roles they 
correspond to provide a particular picture of the events and the world. Some special attention 
concerns the identification of the speaker with the agentive subject through the deictic of the 
first person. Analogously, the use of the pronoun of 1st plural ‘we’ contributes to establishing 
or to arousing the common background of beliefs and feelings between speaker and recipients. 
Devices such as topicalization, in turn, fall within the pragma-linguistic mechanisms addressing 
the audience towards what is assumed by the speaker to be this common semantic space.
All of these properties combine in shaping the illocutionary organization of a sentence. 
Some illocutionary properties of political discourse repeatedly occur, specifically hortative 
formulas and, especially, orders and emotional expressions. It may be banal to wonder why 
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this type of sentences are systematically used in political speeches, to the effect that they are 
pragmatic-oriented sentences linked with the intention of the speaker. Expressive and exclama-
tive sentences externalize “the speaker’s propositional attitude to the state of affairs represented 
by the propositional content” (Beijer 2003: 6). We will concentrate on the relation between 
interpretive properties and expressive devices in speech, i.e. as the outcome of illocutionary 
arrangement and morpho-syntactic organization interplay. 
A clear similarity can be detected between exclamative sentences, independently of the 
syntactic form they have, and the other sentence types that exclude veridicality, characterizing 
instead assertions on states of affairs or individuals and events. So interrogatives and impera-
tives seem to provide some suggestions on the interpretive nature of exclamations insofar as 
an irrealistic temporal and eventive positioning is involved. More precisely, exclamatives are 
generally introduced by interrogative elements such as how and which (a), suggesting that the 
two types of sentence share the same wh- operator-variable structure (Zanuttini and Portner 
2003: 40). That explains one of features of exclamatives, i.e. the fact of denoting a set of alter-
native propositions, as suggested by the definitions ‘surprise’, ‘unexpectedness’, ‘extreme degree’. 
In other words, it is this effect of interpretive widening that characterizes exclamatives as a 
rhetorical means in some sense similar to the other expressive devices. Besides, in exclamatives 
their “propositional content” is presupposed. We can expect to find these properties not only 
in wh- exclamatives but in all types of exclamation, however introducing a scalar interpretation 
based on a deviation from the norm (Beijer 2003). 
In political speech a recurrent modality of exclamative syntax is the rhetorical question, 
i.e. a question including its answer. It has the quality of excluding the introduction of a direct 
evaluation on the part of the speaker, but, at the same time, its content is presupposed and 
prompts the corresponding evaluation in the audience. So, it has properties similar to exclama-
tives, presuppositionality and interpretation of scalar alternants. Let us return to the example 
in (4b), repeated in (39).
(39)  a.  Ma dove siamo finiti in Italia? Libertà per i nostri simboli e la nostra cultura. 
  No al pensiero unico! (23.9.2016)
   ‘But where did we end up in Italy? Freedom for our symbols and our culture. 
  No to the single thought’
The text in (39) contains a rhetorical question introducing an exclamative content, as in (39’):
(39’) But where did we end up in Italy?
  i.  the wh-operator quantifies on a set of propositions, like a true interrogative
  ii.  nevertheless, this question does not expect an answer to the extent that the 
  scalar propositional content ‘Italy ends up in a bad situation’ is presupposed 
  and ‘where’ suggests an unspecified extreme degree, 
A direct exclamation is “No to the single thought!”. An extreme degree content is introduced 
as the rejection of the ‘single thought!’ (i.e. conventional wisdom). The proposition inferable 
content concerning ‘the single thought’ as a value of European policy is assumed as presup-
posed. Analogously, in the 1948 electoral campaign rhetorical questions are used by Alcide De 
Gasperi, the head of DC, in depicting the real nature of communist propaganda, as in (40):
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(40)  E perché dunque l’atteggiamento comunista è così ostile? Perché questo è l’ordine di Mosca: 
 ne abbiamo le prove inconfutabili. (Pescara, 10 aprile; De Gasperi 2008, p. 1284; from 
 Vinciguerra 2016: 282)
  ‘And why then is the communist attitude so hostile? Because this is the order from 
 Moscow: we have the irrefutable proof of this’
Again, in (40) the answer, explicitly given by the orator, is obvious and presupposes the veridi-
cality of hostility by the communist attitude. The combination of the wh- and the quantifier so ‘così’ 
introduces the quantification on the degree of hostility: an extreme degree and an irrefutable danger.
The use of imperatives is typical in exhorting or inviting people to vote for a party or a 
candidate, as the posters discussed in section 5.1 illustrate. However, it shows up in many kinds 
of political messages. Imperatives are strictly linked to a specific illocutionary force, an act of 
command (Aikhenvald 2010), addressed to the recipient. The imperative form generally excludes 
tense distinctions, insofar as it is deictically anchored to the discourse universe. From a typolog-
ical perspective, imperatives overturn the markedness hierarchy underlying assertion/declarative 
sentences. Indeed, while in the latter 1st person subjects are the less marked type of referents, in 
imperatives the most natural type of subject is the 2nd person, the recipient, eventually combined 
with the 1st person in 1st plural inclusive forms (Alcazar and Saltarelli 2014). According to Portner 
(2004) imperatives lexicalize a property ‘which can only be true of the addressee’ rather than an 
event. In other words, the imperative form externalizes the assignment of a property to a prom-
inent argument, however including the addressee (Platzak and Rosengren 1998), and as such, 
from a semantic point of view, imperatives are not submitted to veridicality requirements. So, 
alternative interpretations can be activated by virtue of shared implicatures and presuppositions.
More to the point, a key use of imperatives in political discourse is in the 1st person plural, 
the inclusive ‘we’, as illustrated by the examples in the excerpts in (41a), from the Tweet of Salvini 
already discussed in (4c), and in (41b), from the speech of Togliatti examined in section 5.2.
(41)  a.  Che Futuro abbiamo in testa? Partiamo dalla difesa delle nostre RADICI, 
  dalla nostra tradizione e dalla nostra cultura (24.2.2018)
   ‘What Future do we have in our heads? Let us start from the defence of our 
  Roots, from our tradition and our culture’ 
  b.  La nostra lotta è lotta per la rinascita del nostro Paese, per il suo rinnovamento 
  politico, economico e sociale. In questa lotta noi vogliamo l’unità dei lavoratori, 
  prima di tutto, e, attorno a essa, vogliamo si realizzi l’unità politica e morale di 
  tutta la nazione. Disperdiamo le ombre le quali impediscono la realizzazione 
  di questa unità! (27.3.47)
   ‘Our struggle is a struggle for the rebirth of our country, for its political 
  economic and social renewal. With this struggle, we want the unity of the 
  workers, and around it, we will realize the political and moral unity of the 
  whole nation. Let’s remove the shadows which prevent the realization of this unity!’
In (41a) “Let us start from the defence of our Roots…” designs an attitude, and its imple-
mentation is left open. Differently from exclamations its propositional content is not totally 
presupposed, but it waits to be saturated. Thus, imperatives are entirely played on the adhesion 
of the audience, put to the test. This interpretive mechanism underlies the imperative in 
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Togliatti’s speech in (41b). The imperative exhorts the audience to go beyond suspicions and 
overcome misunderstandings in order to realize the prefigured new unity among the working 
forces. “the shadows that prevent…” are given as recognized, and the propositional content 
of ‘remove’… is prepared by the preceding sentences. The alternatives concern the ‘how’ and 
the ‘when’, the intensity of the engagement towards the announced alternative semantics of 
“rebirth” and “renewal”. The use of the 1st person plural is not only a tool for highlighting the 
common interest between the speaker and the audience, but is the rhetorical way for introducing 
a presuppositional interpretation of the imperative.
6. Conclusions
It is the common conceptual constructs that allow the sender and the recipient to under-
stand one another and to share ideas, symbols and behaviors. These representations are inscribed 
in interpretative schemes, namely the conceptual and emotional framework that gives them a 
more general meaning (“frames”, Goffman 1974). Manipulation, i.e. to obtain the development 
of ‘mental representations’ desired by the issuer on the part of the recipient, takes place in a 
way only partially unconscious. When we speak of manipulation of consciences by political 
propaganda, we must take into account that the recipient has no less intellectual ability and 
the possibility to interpret than the issuer:
Texts are complex structures that prompt readers to construct conceptualisations. […] readers […] 
are not absolutely manipulable. The cognitive ingredients that readers assemble are a kind of bricolage 
guided by the linguistic input. The cognitive structures are not in the texts, they are in people’s heads. 
They can be transferred by texts, but once in people’s heads they can be elaborated in variable ways, 
depending on social and psychological factors. […] Possibly, the conceptual constructs themselves need 
to be already dormant in the social and psychological environment. (Chilton 2005: 39)
The preceding analysis has highlighted that politicians exploit a common symbolic 
universe with their audience, that may be understood as something similar to the “cognitive 
unconscious” of Lakoff and Johnson (1999). That is based on the world-representation formed 
during life starting from socialization in early childhood, through the internalization of ideas, 
metaphoric representations, beliefs, feelings, behaviours. The formation of a particular vision 
of the world is, as we have seen above, the fundamental mechanism of communication, and 
can also be pursued through argumentation as justification of beliefs and assumptions in order 
to motivate a conclusion. Argumentation is inherently oriented to persuade, and implies all 
discourse and textual devices normally used for this purpose. In this sense Glukhova and So-
rokina (2018) conclude that persuasion is a part of argumentation, combining manipulative 
and argumentative strategies. 
Our investigation has been focusing on persuasion, understood as the effect on persons 
achieved by argumentative and/or manipulative political discourse. We have considered the 
semantic effects achieved by means of rhetorical and pragmatic choices in political discourse. 
Metaphors, narrative, argumentative discourse, impolite discourse, claim-type expressions, 
hortative formulas go hand in hand in defining specific levels of interpretation generally im-
plying new semantic spaces and alternative worldviews. Persuasion is the result as the shared 
thought between the speaker and the audience. In keeping with Mercier and Sperber (2011), 
we have taken it that argumentation in political discourse maximally exploits its capability 
of providing elements, whether they are veridical or not, supporting the discourse and its 
conclusions. 
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Indeed, persuasion, i.e. the change in the beliefs and attitudes of the audience caused by political 
discourse cannot be seen as a simple and direct result of the ability of the orator. Persuasion is the 
result of the elaboration of meanings and beliefs on the part of an active audience; it is the result 
of sharing a common worldview and common values. However, politicians are able to exploit and, 
possibly, to activate for power goals, the covert and deep symbolic universe of the people. This is 
their fundamental necessity in order to confirm their leadership and reliability. For such a purpose, 
symbol, metaphors and other rhetorical strategies are put into practice, including rhetorical tools 
which are especially insidious such as the strategies based on the delegitimization of the opponents 
and recourse to emotional adhesion. The systems of values that feed the beliefs and attitudes of 
persons and the cultural and historical framework in which they are immersed are the basis for the 
exchange of meanings in the political arena: persuasion is the sign used in this exchange.
***
With regard to the images reproduced in the text, together with Leonardo M. Savoia (the co-editor of QULSO) 
who in consultation with me has materially carried out the research and collection of all the images online, declare 
that they have been taken from the Internet, that they are images in low definition and that the identification of 
copyrights as well as of their original source have been dutifully but unsuccessfully pursued. The Editors of the 
journal have verified the possibility of establishing rights at least to those images reproduced in text, which could 
be more sensitive, by writing to the addresses of the politicians reproduced in the photos to ask for their consent. 
The same request was made to the Emilia-Romagna Gramsci Foundation, which keeps a digital archive of political 
posters of the election campaigns of 1948 and subsequent dates. I deem therefore that necessary cautions have 
been used and that the requirements envisaged by the relevant provisions under the law have been complied with, 
in view of: (i) the lack of response from politicians – configuring an instance of silent consent - and (ii) the fact 
that the Gramsci Foundation has made it clear that it does not hold copyrights in any case (some would be held 
by institutions and parties that no longer exist), but rather it is only the place where copies of political posters are 
kept (see images nos. 29.b and 30). The same applies to the Archiginnasio Library in Bologna (see image n. 29.a 
in the article) and to other  archives (which are the source of the remaining images). Finally, with reference to all 
the reproductions present in this essay, I refer to art. 64-sexies, paragraph 1 and art. 70, paragraphs 1-bis and 3 of 
Section VII - Data banks of the Law of 22 April 1941, n. 633 and updates.
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